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Would it be possible to increase carbon taxes 
on household energy use and transport, while 
protecting low-income households from negative 
impacts?
There are strong policy arguments for removing environmentally perverse 
subsidies and introducing carbon taxation to incentivise efforts to reduce 
carbon emissions. Green tax reform would shift taxes away from productive 
activity such as income and employment, towards harmful activity such as 
pollution. The difficulty from the perspective of social justice is that green 
taxes are not like income tax; they do not directly relate to the ability to pay.
This project:
•	 looks at whether it is possible to achieve a progressive approach to 
carbon taxation;
•	 examines how to design a revenue-neutral carbon tax on household 
energy use and transport, with a focus on safeguards to protect low-
income households from losing money overall;
•	 concludes that it is possible to protect the majority of low-income 
households, and almost all recipients of means-tested benefits, from 
the negative impact of a carbon tax through an appropriately designed 
compensation package.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At present, much taxation is placed on income, 
employment and other productive activity. Green 
tax reform would shift taxes away from this 
productive activity towards harmful activity such  
as pollution. 
There are strong policy arguments for removing environmentally perverse 
subsidies and for introducing carbon taxation to incentivise efforts to reduce 
carbon emissions. The difficulty from the perspective of social justice is that 
green taxes are unlike income tax; they do not directly relate to the ability 
to pay. This project has therefore examined whether it is possible to achieve 
a progressive approach to carbon taxation. Specifically, it examines how to 
design a revenue-neutral carbon tax on household energy use and transport, 
with a focus on safeguards to protect low-income households from losing 
money overall.
Different sources of carbon are currently treated very differently in the 
tax system. Petrol and diesel are highly taxed; the household use of energy is 
taxed at only 5% VAT rather than the standard rate of 20% VAT; aviation fuel 
is untaxed under the 1944 Chicago Convention. 
The taxation of household energy is particularly controversial because 
expenditure on energy is highly regressive (low-income households spend 
a higher proportion of their income on energy than richer households) 
and because of concerns about fuel poverty. However, carbon taxation 
is widely recognised to be essential for the transition to a low-carbon 
society as taxing household energy at a lower rate than most other forms 
of expenditure is the largest implicit subsidy to fossil-fuel use in the UK 
economy. Such subsidies are distortionary, encouraging energy consumption 
and discouraging energy conservation and measures to reduce emissions 
that contribute to climate change. 
The aim of this project has been to examine possible ways to structure 
the detailed design of changes to taxes and benefits. These involve 
increasing taxes on household use of energy and on some forms of 
transport, and using the revenues to increase tax allowances and benefits, 
such that the tax-benefit package remains revenue-neutral overall,  
enabling low-income households to be protected as far as possible from 
losing money.
06Designing carbon taxation to protect low-income households
This study has used the Centre for Sustainable Energy’s (CSE) 
Distributional Impacts Model for Policy Scenario Analysis (DIMPSA) to 
model the energy consumption and expenditure of UK households, and the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies’ (IFS) model TAXBEN to calculate the effect of 
changes in taxes, tax allowances and benefits. Both models use underlying 
data from the Living Costs and Food (LCF) survey. CSE’s DIMPSA model has 
been extended, through another project funded by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation (JRF), to include estimates of household carbon emissions from 
surface transport, derived from the National Travel Survey (NTS) data, and 
aviation, from Civil Aviation Authority Air Passenger Survey (CAA APS) data. 
The modelling in this study looks forward to 2017/18 and takes into account 
the effects of existing policies and, as far as possible, future policies that are 
already planned. The 2017/18 dateline was chosen because that is when 
Universal Credit will come fully into force.
The carbon taxes examined in this project are carbon pricing for 
household energy and transport, and extending VAT on household energy 
bills. The desire to price carbon in order to reduce carbon emissions led 
the government in the 2011 Budget to introduce a ‘carbon price floor’ 
(CPF) from 2013. The CPF will apply to the fossil-fuel inputs to electricity 
generation and will entail a carbon tax on these inputs, such that when this 
is added to the price of emissions permits under the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme, there will be a minimum price for carbon emissions. This will start 
at £16 per tonne in 2013, rising linearly to £30 per tonne by 2020, and the 
cost will be passed on to end users through their bills. 
The project created two scenarios for modelling an increase of taxation 
on household energy: the first envisages the extension of the CPF to the 
household consumption of gas and non-metered fuels (‘small carbon tax’),1 
which would also be passed on to end users; the second adds to this CPF 
extension an increase in the VAT rate on household energy to 20% (which 
we call the ‘large carbon tax’ as shorthand, although the VAT increase is 
not a true carbon tax). We selected this increase rather than a pure carbon 
tax because the lower rate of VAT for household energy is a tax subsidy 
for energy use and carbon emissions – the major environmentally perverse 
subsidy in the UK. For each of these household energy scenarios, there was 
the further option to include an additional carbon tax at the same level as 
the CPF on transport fuels and on aviation emissions,2 making four (2x2) 
scenarios in all:
•	 Scenario 1: CPF on gas and non-metered fuels only (‘small carbon tax 
without transport’)
•	 Scenario 2: CPF on gas and non-metered fuels, and VAT rate increase on 
household energy (‘large carbon tax without transport’)
•	 Scenario 3: CPF on gas, non-metered fuels and transport (‘small carbon 
tax with transport’)
•	 Scenario 4: CPF on gas, non-metered fuels and transport, and VAT rate 
increase on household energy (‘large carbon tax with transport’).
The team modelled these changes as happening in 2017–18: this coincides 
with the full introduction of Universal Credit. The analysis does not take 
into account changes announced in Budget 2012 (in particular the increase 
in the personal allowance that will take place in 2013–14); this does not 
substantively affect the conclusions of the analysis, as the distributional 
impact of the higher Income Tax Personal Allowance and benefit  
amounts will be much the same irrespective of the base system to which 
they are applied.
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The team designed a series of compensation packages using some of 
the projected revenues from the taxes to address the impacts of the tax 
scenarios on low-income households. The compensation packages involve 
reforms to Universal Credit, in particular increasing the basic amount of 
Universal Credit and lowering the rate at which it is withdrawn as income 
rises. Note that the increase in the Income Tax Personal Allowance takes up 
almost all of the revenue in the case of the small carbon tax applied only to 
gas and non-metered fuels, and that there is no increase in Universal Credit. 
It is important to note that these compensation packages are intended 
to be illustrative: the aim of the research team was to minimise the number 
of low-income ‘losers’ in a way that did not favour a particular household 
type over another (for example, the research team did not particularly aim 
to minimise the number of losing low-income pensioners or lone-parent 
households at the expense of other low-income groups). A government that 
wished to introduce a carbon tax would have its own distributional objectives; 
the analysis here is simply intended to show that the introduction of a 
carbon tax need not disproportionately impact on low-income households 
if the revenues from the carbon tax are used to fund an appropriate 
compensation package. 
It is important to bear two caveats in mind. Firstly, TAXBEN assumes full 
take-up of means-tested benefits. This means that in practice there will be 
more low-income losers than we estimate in our results, where full take-
up does not occur. Clearly, the take-up rate of the new Universal Credit 
will be crucial in determining how important a factor this will be. Existing 
means-tested benefits and tax credits for those of working age already 
have relatively high rates of take-up, often in excess of 90% – at least for 
those on lower incomes.3 The government hopes that Universal Credit will 
have a higher take-up rate as it is a single benefit that families can continue 
claiming whether they are in or out of work. However, Pension Credit has 
a lower rate of take-up, particularly among pensioners with small amounts 
of private income. It is therefore likely that more lower-income pensioners 
will lose out from the introduction of a carbon tax than we estimate here. 
Secondly, the analysis does not take account of individuals changing their 
labour market or other behaviours in response to either the introduction of 
the carbon tax or an increase in means-tested benefits.
The small carbon tax without transport and its associated compensation 
package has a very different overall distributional impact to the other 
variants and their compensation packages. This is because increasing the 
income tax allowance takes up most of the revenue from the small carbon 
tax without transport, whereas the package with larger tax revenues leaves 
much more revenue to increase the means-tested benefits that go to 
lower-income groups. The reason for that is because the first package was 
designed to achieve the stated government policy of increasing the Income 
Tax Personal Allowance to £10,000 a year.
By contrast, in the other three scenarios the larger amount of revenue 
gained in taxation enables increases in Universal Credit and Pension Credit 
similar in size to the gains wealthier households receive from the increase 
in the Income Tax Personal Allowance, with the effect that, on average, 
households on lower incomes gain quite significantly. Revenue neutrality 
means that this gain is balanced by average losses in higher-income 
households, although because their incomes are much higher the losses are 
much smaller as a percentage of income.
The small carbon tax without transport (carbon price floor on gas and 
non-metered fuels only) is relatively small in magnitude, so relatively few 
households are affected by more than one pound per week. Even those who 
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lose by more than a pound a week in low-income deciles do not lose much 
more. Losers are predominantly found in lower-income rather than higher-
income groups; this is because, as explained previously, these groups  
gain little from the increase in the Income Tax Personal Allowance that 
forms the majority of the compensation package for the small carbon  
tax without transport. 
The other tax scenarios, with larger carbon taxes and their associated 
compensation packages, have relatively fewer households who are broadly 
unaffected. Most low-income households gain from these packages, and 
most high-income households lose. As the compensation packages are 
deliberately skewed towards lower-income households, this is unsurprising. 
Despite this, however, the compensation packages do not eliminate low-
income losers completely, demonstrating how difficult it is to completely 
compensate all low-income households when a carbon tax is introduced.
The main reason for this is that in these compensation packages there are 
some low-income households that will not be eligible for Universal Credit or 
Pension Credit – almost all of those entitled to Universal Credit do not lose 
out overall from the introduction of the large carbon tax (with or without 
the transport tax). In some cases this is because they have considerable 
savings or other assets which mean they are not entitled to Universal Credit, 
perhaps suggesting that they have only a temporarily low income. In others, 
it is because they are households of students, who are generally not entitled 
to benefits. Overall, however, it is possible to protect the vast majority of 
low-income households from the negative impact of a carbon tax through 
an appropriately designed compensation package. 
Analysis based on a fairly complex statistical methodology, Chi-squared 
Automatic Interaction Detector (CHAID) analysis, then looked in detail 
at which kinds of households (grouped into categories called ‘nodes’) 
gain or lose. The main ‘losing’ nodes are dominated by working higher-
income couples with or without children in larger properties, not eligible 
for Universal Credit, but with high household fuel and transport emissions. 
Being higher-income households, the fact that they are losing out is less of a 
concern from a social justice point of view, but could be a politically sensitive 
issue given the nature of these groups (‘hard-working’ adults and families). 
In the modelling, we have tried to protect low-income households, meaning 
that most of them gain from the packages we have simulated. That inevitably 
means that there have to be higher-income losers to keep each package 
revenue-neutral.
To explore the sensitivity of the results to changes in underlying trends 
for energy demand, and the fact that some households will use energy-
efficiency measures to make their homes warmer rather than save energy 
(called ‘comfort-taking’), the team undertook some additional analysis and 
found that the difference was not large enough to have a significant effect 
on our results.
Due to concerns raised in advance of the modelling that using changes 
in Income Tax Personal Allowance, tax credits and the benefits system 
might not be sufficient to adequately compensate low-income households 
for higher energy and transport taxes, other approaches were also 
investigated. These included exemptions from higher taxes on household 
energy for households in receipt of certain benefits – rather like the 
system that currently exists for free school meals – or concessions for rural 
areas. However, on the basis of this research, it has been concluded that 
compensation through tax and benefits would be sufficiently effective, and 
that the administrative complexity of the exemptions investigated could 
not be justified by their extra distributional benefits. The Rural Fuel Duty 
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Executive summary
Reduction Pilot Scheme, which reduces fuel duty by 5p a litre on remote 
Scottish islands and the Scilly Isles, could be extended to remote areas of 
the Highlands as well, but it would not be practical to extend it to rural areas 
more widely because of the risk of people driving to such areas especially to 
fill up with cheaper fuel.
The main conclusion of the project is that if the government wishes to 
use taxation to help reduce CO2 emissions, it should not be dissuaded from 
doing so by distributional considerations provided that at the same it applies 
appropriate compensation measures. This report shows that it is possible 
to protect the vast majority of low-income households (though not all) and 
almost all recipients of means-tested benefits from the negative impact of  
a carbon tax through an appropriately designed compensation package.
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1 PROJECT 
RATIONALE
Under the 2008 Climate Change Act, the 
government is legally obliged to reduce emissions 
of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse 
gases that contribute to climate change by 80% 
from 1990 levels by 2050, with reductions in the 
intervening period being made according to five-
yearly ‘carbon budgets’. There are two principal ways 
of reducing carbon emissions from the household 
sector, which are the focus of this project. 
One way is to increase the energy efficiency of homes, so that people can 
keep warm using less energy. UK governments have had policies in this 
area for a number of years, and the average energy efficiency of homes 
has increased. Further policies – most notably the Green Deal and the 
Energy Company Obligation – are the subject of current consultation and 
legislation. These are important policies, but their detail is largely outside the 
scope of this project, though they are mentioned when they are relevant to 
its main analysis.
The other principal way of achieving cuts in carbon emissions (from all 
sectors) is to use public policy to put a price on carbon – indeed, carbon 
pricing is widely recognised to be essential for the transition to a low-carbon 
society – and this, and the implications for low-income households, provide 
the main focus of this project.
At the level of the EU, carbon pricing is achieved through the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and the government has supplemented 
this with a number of other taxes related to energy or carbon emissions, 
including the Climate Change Levy and the Carbon Price Floor (CPF). 
The CPF is a policy instrument intended to ensure that electricity 
generators face a minimum price for the carbon contained in any fossil fuels 
that they burn, in order to encourage them to use and invest in low-carbon 
technologies. The CPF is made up of the price of the permits in the EU  
ETS plus a carbon tax on the fossil-fuel inputs to power generation, applied 
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each year at a rate to ensure that the overall price of carbon for the fuels  
burned in power stations rises steadily from £16 per tonne CO2 (/t CO2) 
in 2013 to £30/t CO2 in 2020. In addition to giving an incentive to power 
generators to use low-carbon technologies, this carbon price will be passed 
through to the electricity prices faced by consumers, encouraging them to 
buy more efficient appliances and generally use less electricity, reducing 
further the emissions and other damaging environmental effects from  
power generation.
However, this taxation of the carbon inputs to electricity is not matched 
by the taxation of carbon-based fuels used by households, mainly natural 
gas for heating. Indeed, not only is the gas used by households not subject 
to a carbon tax, but it only has a 5% rate of VAT, compared to 20% VAT 
charged on practically all other goods and services. Aviation fuel used for 
international flights also cannot be taxed, because of commitments in the 
1944 Chicago Convention, an international agreement to which the UK 
is a signatory (as are nearly all other countries). This is an implicit subsidy 
to household gas and aviation uses, which distorts markets (for example, 
the choice between untaxed gas and taxed electricity) and discourages 
energy conservation and investments in energy efficiency, thereby having 
the environmentally perverse effect of increasing emissions. There is near-
universal agreement among policy makers that, in principle, such subsidies 
should be removed. In this case, applying the CPF and the full rate of VAT 
to household gas use and taxing aviation emissions provide the means of 
removing these subsidies.
The problem in practice with taxing the household use of energy is 
that low-income households spend a higher proportion of their income 
on this energy than do higher-income households. Such a tax would hit 
lower-income households disproportionately hard (i.e. would be regressive), 
unless they could be compensated in some way. In addition, such an 
uncompensated tax could increase the numbers of households in fuel 
poverty at a time when the government has a commitment to reduce such 
numbers, and indeed to eliminate fuel poverty entirely.4 However, it is also 
the case that general energy subsidies, such as a lower rate of VAT, are a 
very inefficient way of helping low-income households; this is because most 
of the subsidy actually goes to higher-income households, who use more 
energy in absolute terms than lower-income households do.
The aim of this project was to see whether it would be possible to remove 
the subsidies on the household use of energy, particularly by applying the 
CPF and the full rate of VAT to household gas use. The subsequent revenues 
could then be used to fund a package of compensations through the tax 
and benefit system that would ensure that no (or very few) low-income 
households were worse off as a result. The CPF was also applied to transport 
fuels and on aviation emissions in order to provide a further incentive to 
reduce carbon emissions from transport.
Because the Coalition Government has a pledge to raise the Income  
Tax Personal Allowance to £10,000 over the course of this Parliament, 
the team looked at the distributional effect of recycling some of the tax 
revenues this might generate. Increasing the Income Tax Personal  
Allowance would help those on moderately low incomes, but of course  
not those on incomes below the tax threshold. So for this latter group, 
additional or alternative measures to help were considered – including 
through the benefits system – in attempting to ensure that the higher 
energy price did not have a regressive effect. In addition, we looked at 
concessions for rural areas. The absence of the gas network in many  
rural locations and the lack of public transport makes per-household 
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emissions in those areas higher than in more densely populated parts of  
the country.
The research has utilised the Centre for Sustainable Energy’s (CSE) 
‘Distributional Impacts Model for Policy and Strategic Analysis’ (DIMPSA) 
model with data on UK household energy use and emissions to simulate the 
impacts of the chosen taxes: a carbon tax on gas at the level of the CPF, 
as announced in Budget 2011; an increase in the VAT rate on household 
energy use from the current 5% to the standard rate of 20%; and an increase 
in tax equivalent to the level of the CPF on road fuels and on aviation 
emissions. The policy scenarios explored, and the results from the models of 
levying these taxes, are presented in Chapters 2 and 3.
In addition to encouraging people to reduce their energy use and 
emissions, the carbon tax raises revenues which, as noted above, can be 
used to compensate households for the extra cost of their energy. The main 
compensation mechanisms proposed are increasing the Income Tax Personal 
Allowance, increasing the State Pension and Pension Credit, and increasing 
payments under Universal Credit. This is the first time that this new benefit 
structure has been used for such analysis. The effects of these compensation 
mechanisms have been explored using the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ (IFS) 
TAXBEN model, and the results of this work are described in Chapter 4.
Analysis of the results from the TAXBEN model can then indicate the 
‘winner’ and ‘loser’ households from the taxation-plus-compensation 
scenarios. The DIMPSA model can then be used again to identify the 
principal relevant characteristics of the main groups of winning and losing 
households. The results of this analysis are given in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Chapter 7 discusses other ways in which low-income households that lose 
out even after the compensation packages could be further compensated.
The DIMPSA model estimates the impact of various energy-efficiency 
measures on the energy use of households, but the actual effect of these 
measures can differ from the modelled effect because the measures are 
not as effective as assumed in real life, or because of the rebound effect.5 
The use of real energy-consumption data following an intervention allows 
a comparison between the modelled impact and the actual performance. 
Chapter 8 discusses the approach taken to re-running the DIMPSA model 
to allow for actual in-situ performance of policy measures and the effect 
of this on the overall outcomes. Chapter 9 presents a sensitivity analysis 
for the results of the modelling, looking at the scale of the uncertainties 
in the output of the model and how they are affected by different sources 
of uncertainty in the inputs to the model, including the assumptions about 
rebound and the effectiveness of the measures.
Chapter 10 describes the overall conclusions drawn from the research: 
that it is possible to protect the vast majority of low-income households 
(though not all) and almost all recipients of means-tested benefits from 
the negative impact of a carbon tax through an appropriately designed 
compensation package. 
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2 POLICY MODELLING 
AND SCENARIO 
DESIGN
This chapter explains the methods underpinning 
our study, explaining carbon policy reduction 
opportunities and their impacts. The study uses 
CSE’s Distributional Impacts Model for Policy 
Scenario Analysis (DIMPSA). This modelling tool 
has been developed by CSE, through close working 
with the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC), which uses the model for their own 
modelling analysis of policy impacts.6 
DIMPSA
DIMPSA is based on the Living Costs and Food (LCF) survey, from which 
data on household energy consumption is derived. The LCF does not include 
detailed information on physical household characteristics, other than built 
form, which are important in modelling the impact of energy policies. Data 
from the 2007/8 English Housing Survey (EHS) was therefore used by CSE 
to generate a predictive model to identify wall type, loft insulation levels and 
heating system age/communal heating in the LCF dataset.
For the purpose of the model, data from four LCF surveys has been 
combined, (financial years 2004/5, 2005/6, and calendar years 2006, 2007) 
generating a sample size of over 20,000 cases. Time- and location-specific 
fuel price information was used to convert survey expenditure data on 
household fuels into consumption. The model then uses a look-up table 
containing a set of fuel prices from 2010 to 2030 by method of payment to 
estimate household energy bills in the baseline year.7 These prices are based 
upon DECC figures for average gas and electricity prices (taken from the 
average price and bills model).
DIMPSA identifies types of households in the LCF that may be suitable 
for energy-efficiency measures and sustainable energy technologies. 
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A number of standard criteria are applied in the model to constrain the 
application of measures. Variables used include: tenure, built form, central 
heating type, number of rooms, occupants, age of household representative, 
rurality, and wall type (modelled). For example, solid wall insulation will be 
applied only to households with uninsulated solid walls, whereas biomass 
boilers may not be appropriate in urban areas.
Policies currently modelled within DIMPSA (as applied in this study) 
include:
•	 Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT);
•	 Feed-in Tariff (FIT) and Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI);
•	 smart meters;
•	 Warm Home Discount;
•	 EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS);
•	 Renewables Obligation (RO);
•	 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS);
•	 Product Policy;
•	 Energy Company Obligation (ECO) and Green Deal;
•	 Carbon Price Floor (CPF).
See the Glossary (page 68) for further explanation of these policies.
The total policy costs passed through to domestic customers are 
dependent upon which sectors the policy affects. For instance, FITs will apply 
to both domestic and non-domestic customers, so the costs have therefore 
been split between these two customer groups based on their total annual 
consumption. In addition, cost is distributed based on the fuel types covered 
by the policy, i.e. electricity, gas, oil, coal or liquid petroleum gas (LPG).  
The total policy costs to distribute domestically are then divided between  
the relevant fuels according to the weighted number of consumers using 
each type.
Policy measures are targeted at specific groups consistent with 
policy design and are randomly distributed between eligible households. 
For example, FIT measures are targeted at groups of early adopters of 
technology identified through specific household characteristics. ECO 
measures are targeted at groups that are identified as vulnerable households. 
The levels of savings associated with different measures are estimated based 
on the year and household characteristics, and are adjusted for comfort-
taking. For any heat consumption reduction measure, renewable heat 
pump or insulation measure, the savings are adjusted in the model to allow 
for comfort-taking (for example, applying a rate of 15% to be consistent 
with the assumptions on comfort-taking used in the Green Deal impact 
assessment). 
Product Policy improves the energy efficiency of appliances and other 
products that use energy by tightening the standards they must meet. 
Savings are applied in each year based on the number of large and small 
appliances the household has (with the savings associated with lighting 
distributed according to the number of rooms). Smart meter savings are 
based on a constant percentage reduction consistent with the roll-out 
profile in the government’s smart meter Impact Assessment. 
The installation of FIT measures will include some level of tariff payment. 
That is, the installation of a small-scale generator (for example, solar 
panels) reduces household consumption of electricity from the grid but 
also provides a payment on top. There is also an additional payment for any 
surplus electricity fed back into the grid. Depending on the type of measure, 
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Policy modelling and scenario design
household and year, a corresponding tariff payment is estimated. Tariff 
payments from the grid to households taking up FIT measures are netted off 
the final bill. 
The Warm Home Discount (WHD) provides a rebate on bills for certain 
vulnerable households (£130 per household in 2012/13). The discounts are 
targeted at three specific groups of vulnerable consumers: a ‘legacy group’ 
who will continue to receive support, including social tariffs, similar to that 
under the previous voluntary agreement between energy suppliers and the 
government; a ‘core group’ of low-income and vulnerable households; and a 
wider ‘broader group’. Each group has specific characteristics consistent with 
criteria for vulnerable households.8 The level of rebate is specified for each 
group and subtracted from the final bill. 
Policy costs and measures are input into DIMPSA to produce an 
estimated final energy consumption and bill for each household in the model. 
Modelling carbon taxation
This study is concerned specifically with the impact of carbon taxation, 
as applied to household energy use and personal travel. The LCF dataset 
underpinning CSE’s DIMPSA model has been extended, through another 
JRF-funded project, to include estimates of household carbon emissions 
from surface transport (derived from the NTS, 2002–6) and aviation (from 
CAA APS data).9 This research utilises this newly developed, comprehensive 
dataset to simulate the impacts of various designs for a carbon tax through 
DIMPSA covering the emissions from all modes of transport, including 
aviation.
As part of this project DIMPSA has been extended to allow the user to 
apply the CPF to all domestic fuels and also change the VAT rate of the final 
energy bill. 
Carbon taxation scenarios
Modelling the impact of carbon taxation was done first with household 
energy only and was then extended to include both household energy 
and transport, thus enabling analysis of distributional differences between 
the two approaches. With respect to household energy, the project team 
considered several different approaches for modelling carbon taxation. 
As the price of carbon in the EU ETS has not been certain enough 
or high enough to encourage sufficient low-carbon investment, the 
government has introduced the CPF to set a minimum price for carbon in 
the electricity generation sector. Our first decision on how to tax carbon 
emissions resulting from household energy use was to extend the CPF 
to include the household use of gas and non-metered fuels.10 This would 
remove carbon-charging disparity across fuels used by domestic consumers. 
The team performed some initial analysis to vary the CPF by doubling the 
amount to be applied to all fuels; however, this approach seemed arbitrary 
without prior research to suggest a suitable higher price.
Our second decision was to remove the VAT subsidy on household 
fuels (i.e. to increase the VAT rate for household energy from 5% to the 
standard 20% VAT rate).11 This resulted in the first two agreed scenarios 
for modelling: the first models the impact of applying the CPF to gas and 
non-metered fuels (‘small carbon tax’); the second models the CPF on gas 
and non-metered fuels along with a change in the VAT rate (‘large carbon 
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tax’). These two scenarios are combined with the imposition, or not, of an 
additional carbon tax on all transport emissions, including aviation, applied at 
the same CPF rate.
As described above, DIMPSA has been extended to include the full range 
of UK Government carbon and fuel poverty policies, which utilise the latest 
thinking and assumptions from DECC. However, within these there remain 
several uncertainties around policy costs and impacts, for example around 
the Green Deal and ECO (final decisions about which had still to be taken 
at the time this research was being carried out), and assumptions around 
savings from Product Policy and the impact of comfort-taking. As such, for 
the purpose of this research study the team decided it prudent to run two 
policy scenarios in DIMPSA:
1 Limited: models only those policies where costs and outputs are less 
ambiguous (i.e. excluding the Green Deal, ECO, Product Policy and 
comfort-taking). 
2 All: includes all policies, with assumptions built in as necessary.
Combining the carbon taxation scenarios (household fuels only/household 
fuels and transport; CPF only/CPF and VAT rate change) and policy 
modelling scenarios described above provides eight unique modelling 
scenarios to be simulated through DIMPSA, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Carbon pricing and policy scenarios modelled
Carbon taxation scenario A: Policy Scenario 
– Limited
B: Policy Scenario 
– All
1  Small non-transport (CPF on gas & 
non-metered fuels only)
Scenario 1.A Scenario 1.B
2  Large non-transport (CPF on gas & 
non-metered fuels & VAT rate change
Scenario 2.A Scenario 2.B
3  Small inc. transport (CPF on gas & 
non-metered fuels, and transport)
Scenario 3.A Scenario 3.B
4  Large inc. transport (CPF on gas  
& non-metered fuels and transport & 
VAT rate change)
Scenario 4.A Scenario 4.B
Conclusion
In developing new mechanisms for carbon pricing and green taxation, the 
team could have explored a multitude of options. The final decision to extend 
the CPF to all domestic fuels and remove the lower VAT rate were partially 
based on the practical opportunity to implement and the predefined effects 
of their application, i.e. the CPF and the higher VAT rate are known.
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3 OVERALL REVENUES 
RAISED FROM CARBON 
TAXATION
The results of running the carbon taxation and 
policy scenarios through DIMPSA showed there is 
only a marginal difference in the overall impact on 
emissions (and therefore in revenue raised) of the 
two different policy scenarios (i.e. ‘limited policies’ 
versus ‘all policies’ – see Table 2 and Figure 1). 
This is the result of interaction effects between Product Policy and the 
Green Deal and ECO: the benefits of the Green Deal and ECO – i.e. 
reductions in heat consumption resulting from measures – are outweighed 
by the impact of Product Policy, which indirectly increases gas demand when 
applied in the model because the energy savings for consumer electronics 
through improved efficiencies are such that heating use increases in some 
properties to counteract the loss of ambient heating from electronic 
products.12
The IFS TAXBEN model uses ONS population projections to create new 
weights in the dataset to mimic projected population change within the 
modelling timeframe (i.e. to 2017).13 The weightings are designed to ensure 
that the population profile of the dataset used in this study corresponds with 
ONS figures for 2010 and 2017 (see Table 18, Chapter 9).
Table 2: Impact of policy modelling scenarios on household emissions
Total 
household 
emissions
Average  
household 
emissions
Count of 
households
Baseline year (survey weight) 128 MtCO2 5.3 tCO2 24,206,750
Scenario A (Ltd) (2017 weight) 133 MtCO2 4.5 tCO2 28,097,519
Scenario B (All) (2017 weight) 127 MtCO2 4.8 tCO2 28,097,519
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Figure 1: Total revenue raised under each Policy and Carbon Pricing 
Scenario (£billion) 
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TAXBEN uses these weightings to give an accurate reflection of the demand 
for welfare benefits in 2017. To ensure consistency, the Baseline Survey 
population in DIMPSA was weighted to arrive at a new 2017 population that 
took account of population growth (as shown in Table 18) in the analysis 
of the impacts of government policy on household emissions in 2017. This 
has implications for the level of emissions reductions resulting from policy 
impacts (as a direct result of the new weightings increasing the number of 
people and households represented in the dataset). This is explored in more 
detail in Chapter 9. 
As Figure 1 shows, applying the CPF to gas and non-metered fuels only 
(small carbon tax without transport, shown as Small CT) raises revenue of 
around £1.86 billion (under the ‘all policy’ scenario). Extending the CPF to 
transport emissions as well (small carbon tax with transport) raises some 
additional £2.76 billion. Table 3 shows the revenues raised from each 
individual tax component in the scenarios, so that the total revenue raised 
under the small carbon tax with transport is around £4.6 billion. If the higher 
VAT rate is applied on top of the CPF (large carbon tax, shown as Large CT), 
an additional £4.99 billion is raised, bringing the total revenue to some £9.6 
billion under the ‘all policy’ scenario with transport emissions tax. All the 
revenue is redistributed through the compensation mechanisms described in 
the next chapter.
Table 3: Revenue raised under each individual component of the taxation 
scenarios modelled 
Carbon taxation Limited All
(A) (£bn) (B) (£bn)
‘Small CT’ (CPF to gas & non-metered, no transport)
   + CPF on Transport Emissions
   + VAT @20%
£1.85
+£2.76
+£4.79
£1.86
+£2.76
+£4.99
Total Revenue Raised (‘Large CT inc transport’) £9.40 £9.61
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Because the differences 
between the two policy 
scenarios (‘limited 
policy’ and ‘all policy’) 
are small, all of the 
further analysis was 
done only on the ‘all 
policy’ cases.
Overall revenues raised from carbon taxation
Conclusion
The eight scenarios have the potential to generate between £1.86 billion 
(under the ‘small carbon tax with transport – all policy’ scenario) and £9.6 
billion (under the ‘large carbon tax with VAT – all policy’ scenario). Because 
the differences between the two policy scenarios (‘limited policy’ and ‘all 
policy’) are small, all of the further analysis was done only on the ‘all policy’ 
cases. Having run all the carbon pricing and policy scenarios through 
DIMPSA, the resulting values of revenue raised then formed the basis  
for modelling compensation packages in TAXBEN, as described in the  
next chapter.
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4 TAX AND BENEFIT 
COMPENSATION 
PACKAGES
This chapter uses the IFS tax and benefit 
microsimulation model TAXBEN to analyse 
compensation packages which recycle the revenue 
raised by the carbon taxes back to households. 
The distributional impact of each carbon tax and 
its associated compensation package is presented 
along with the number of winners and losers from 
the combined impact of each carbon tax and the 
compensation packages.
TAXBEN
TAXBEN calculates households’ tax liabilities and benefit entitlements 
under different tax and benefit policies. It uses information on households’ 
demographic characteristics, gross incomes, expenditures and entitlement 
to non means-tested benefits (from input data and tax/benefit parameters) 
to calculate households’ direct and indirect tax liabilities and entitlements 
to means-tested benefits, tax credits and non means-tested benefits. 
A detailed, though dated, description of the model is given by Giles and 
McCrae (1995).14 TAXBEN is set up to run on various UK household surveys, 
including the data from the Living Cost and Food (LCF) survey from 2004–7 
that is used by the DIMPSA model. In our analysis, financial values from 
this data have been uprated to 2017/18 prices in line with actual earnings 
growth from 2007–12 and the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
forecast of earnings growth from 2012–17. 
As described in the previous chapter, the DIMPSA model calculates the 
amount each household in the LCF data has to pay in each of the carbon 
tax scenarios. TAXBEN was then used to design appropriate compensation 
packages for these carbon taxes. As described above, TAXBEN uses 
information on each household’s pre-tax income from the same LCF data 
21Tax and benefit compensation packages
to calculate how much they would gain from the compensation packages we 
consider for each of the variants of the carbon tax. The aim of the research 
team in constructing these compensation packages was to minimise the 
number of low-income losers from the introduction of the carbon tax. 
Combining this information with the simulated carbon tax liabilities for each 
household calculated by DIMPSA makes it possible to calculate whether 
each household in the LCF data gains or loses, and by how much, from the 
combined effect of the carbon tax and the compensation package. 
The team modelled these changes as happening in 2017/18: this 
coincides with the full introduction of Universal Credit. The analysis does 
not take into account changes announced in Budget 2012 (in particular the 
increase in the personal allowance that will take place in 2013/14): this does 
not substantively affect the conclusions of our analysis, as the distributional 
impact of the higher tax allowances and benefit amounts will be much the 
same irrespective of the base system to which they are applied. In each case, 
the revenue is first used to increase the Income Tax Personal Allowance 
for those aged under 65 by £355 in nominal terms (under our pre-Budget 
2012 base system, the personal allowance is £9,645, meaning that this 
increase takes the allowance to £10,000 in 2017/18; in reality the  
personal allowance will already be more than £10,000 in 2017/18 as a  
result of policy changes announced in Budget 2012 and the usual indexation 
of tax thresholds). To give a similar benefit to pensioners, the value of the 
basic State Pension is also increased. The remaining revenue is used to 
increase means-tested benefit rates, in order to minimise the number of 
low-income losers.
By 2017/18, the rollout of the government’s new Universal Credit, which 
will replace most existing means-tested benefits and tax credits for those 
of working age, will be nearly complete.15 Therefore, the compensation 
packages involve changes to Universal Credit, in particular increasing the 
basic amounts of Universal Credit and lowering the rate at which it is 
withdrawn as incomes rise.16 The compensation packages in the two variants 
of the carbon tax are as outlined in Table 4. All figures are in nominal terms 
in 2017/18. Note that the increase in the personal allowance takes up 
almost all of the revenue in the case of the small carbon tax applied only to 
gas and non-metered fuels and that there is no increase in Universal Credit. 
It is important to note that these compensation packages are intended 
to be illustrative: the aim of the research team was to minimise the number 
of low-income losers in a way that did not favour one particular household 
type over another (so we do not particularly favour pensioners or lone-
parent households, for example). A government that wished to introduce 
a carbon tax would have its own distributional objectives: the analysis here 
is simply intended to show that the introduction of a carbon tax need not 
disproportionately impact on low-income households if combined with an 
appropriate compensation package. 
Before showing the results of this analysis, it is important to bear two 
important caveats in mind. Firstly, TAXBEN assumes full take-up of means-
tested benefits. As in practice there is some non-take-up of benefits, there 
will be more low-income losers than we estimate in our results. Clearly, the 
take-up rate of the new Universal Credit will be crucial in determining how 
important a factor this will be. Existing means-tested benefits and tax credits 
for those of working age already have high rates of take-up, often in excess 
of 90%, especially for those on lower incomes.18 The government hopes that 
Universal Credit will have a higher take-up rate as it is a single benefit that 
families can continue claiming whether they are in or out of work. However, 
Pension Credit has a lower rate of take-up, particularly among pensioners
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Table 4: Compensation packages 
Annual increase in: Small carbon 
tax package 
without 
transport
Large carbon 
tax package 
without 
transport
Small 
carbon tax 
package with 
transport
Large 
carbon tax 
package with 
transport
Personal allowance £355 £355 £355 £455
Basic State Pension £15 £70 £70 £100
Pension Credit for 
singles
£15 £300 £120 £450
Pension Credit for 
couples
£15 £500 £300 £850
Universal Credit 
for singles without 
children
£0 £300 £160 £325
Universal Credit for 
lone parents
£0 £200 £150 £350
Universal Credit 
for couples without 
children
£0 £700 £325 £925
Universal Credit 
for couples with 
children
£0 £300 £160 £400
Universal Credit 
taper rate17
65%  
(no change)
64% (1ppt 
reduction)
65%  
(no change)
63% (2ppt 
reduction)
Total cost of 
package
£1.8 billion £6.8 billion £4.6 billion £9.6 billion
with small amounts of private income.19 It is therefore likely that more 
lower-income pensioners will lose out from the introduction of a carbon tax 
than we estimate here.
Secondly, the analysis does not take account of individuals changing their 
labour market or other behaviours in response to either the introduction of 
the carbon tax or increasing means-tested benefits. Both of these policies 
tend to weaken the incentives for individuals to do paid work, although this 
weakening is offset at least to some extent by the increase in the income 
tax allowance and the reduction in the rate at which Universal Credit is 
withdrawn as incomes rise, as included in the compensation packages. Any 
government wishing to introduce a compensation package for a carbon tax 
would in practice have to balance distributional goals against other objectives 
it may have. 
Overview of distributional impacts from TAXBEN
Figures 2–5 below show the distributional impact of the overall packages 
by income decile. The figures show average carbon tax amounts and the 
average amount of compensation for each income decile. 
The CPF on gas and unmetered fuels only, and its associated compensation 
package, has a very different overall distributional impact to the other 
variants and their compensation packages. As shown by Figure 2, it is higher-
income households who benefit the most from a higher personal allowance 
in cash terms. Higher-income households tend to have two or more earners, 
and hence benefit more than once from the higher personal allowance. 
By contrast, around a third of adults in the UK do not have incomes high 
enough to pay income tax in the first place, so it is unsurprising that most 
low-income households do not benefit at all from this measure.20 Because
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Figure 2: Distributional impact of CPF on gas and unmetered fuels only 
(small carbon tax without transport) and associated compensation package
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increasing the Income Tax Personal Allowance takes up most of the revenue 
in this scenario, there is little revenue left over to increase means-tested 
benefits that go to lower-income groups. The other scenarios raise more 
revenue and there is much more left over to increase benefits after the 
increase in the income tax allowance.
By contrast, as shown in Figure 3, the larger amount of revenue enables 
increases in Universal Credit and Pension Credit similar in size to the gains 
wealthier households receive from the increase in the Income Tax Personal 
Allowance, with the effect that on average households on lower incomes 
gain quite significantly. Revenue neutrality means that this gain is balanced 
by average losses in higher-income households, although because their 
incomes are much higher the losses are much smaller as a percentage of 
their incomes.
In Figure 4, lower-income households again gain on average. Because 
the revenues from the package shown in Figure 4 are smaller than in the 
previous package, the average gains and losses are smaller than those shown 
in Figure 3.
In Figure 5, lower-income households again gain on average. Because 
the package is bigger than in the preceding scenarios, the average gains and 
losses are greater.
The small carbon tax without transport and its associated compensation 
package (shown in Figure 2) has a very different overall distributional impact 
to the other variants and their compensation packages because, as explained 
above, low-income households that do not pay tax gain no benefit from the 
increased personal income tax allowance, leaving little revenue to increase 
benefits. The reason for this is that the first package was designed to first 
achieve the stated government policy of increasing the Income Tax Personal 
Allowance to £10,000 a year, which left very little money over for benefit 
increases. However, it would of course be possible to design a compensation 
package for this measure that did not involve increasing the personal 
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allowance and instead increased means-tested benefits: Figure 6 shows the 
impact of such a policy. However, in the remainder of the analysis in this 
and the following chapter, we retain the compensation package described in 
Table 4 and analysed in Figure 2.21
Figure 3: Distributional impact of CPF on gas and unmetered fuels and 
increased VAT on household energy (large carbon tax without transport) 
with associated compensation package
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Notes and sources: as for Figure 2.
Figure 4: Distributional impact of CPF on gas, non-metered fuels and 
transport (small carbon tax with transport) and associated compensation 
package
Notes and sources: as for Figure 2
An
nu
al
 c
as
h 
ga
in
/l
os
s
 –£800
–£600
–£400
–£200
£0
 £200
£400
£600
£800
G
ain/loss as a percentage of incom
e
 –2.00%
–1.50%
–1.00%
–0.50%
0.00%
 0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest
Income decile group
Carbon tax loss (cash, left axis)
Compensation package gain (cash, left axis)
Total gain/loss as a % of income (right axis)
25Tax and benefit compensation packages
Figure 5: Distributional impact of CPF on gas, non-metered fuels and 
transport and increased VAT on household energy (large carbon tax with 
transport) and associated compensation package
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Notes and sources: as for Figure 2
In Figure 6, the distributional outcome is similar to those shown in Figures 
3–5, with low-income deciles gaining on average. Because the revenue is 
less than in the other scenarios, the average gains and losses are smaller too.
Figure 6: Distributional impact of small carbon tax without transport and 
more progressive compensation package
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Notes and sources: as for Figure 2
Figures 2–5 show the average gain or loss by income decile from each of 
the carbon taxes and their associated compensation packages. However, as 
shown below, there are winners and losers from each overall package within 
each income decile group. In Figures 7–10, we show the proportion of each 
income decile group that gains or loses from the combined effects of each 
carbon tax and its associated compensation package. Following standard 
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practice in IFS analysis, we include a ‘broadly unaffected’ category for those 
households who gain or lose less than one pound per week (£52 per year) as 
a combined result of the carbon tax and compensation package (see Box 1 
for full details). 
Box 1: Defining winners and losers 
Overall gain or loss = compensation package gain minus carbon tax
Winners = overall gain of at least £52 per year
Broadly unaffected = overall gain or loss less than £52 per year
Losers = overall loss of at least £52 per year
In Figure 7, the small carbon tax without transport (CPF on gas and 
non-metered fuels only) is relatively small in magnitude, so relatively few 
households are affected by more than one pound per week. Even those 
who lose by more than this in low-income deciles do not lose much more. 
Losers are predominantly found in lower-income groups – this is because, 
as explained previously, these groups gain little from the increase in the 
Income Tax Personal Allowance that forms the majority of the compensation 
package for the small carbon tax without transport. 
Figure 7: Winners and losers by income decile from CPF on gas and 
unmetered fuels (small carbon tax without transport) and associated 
compensation package
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The other tax scenarios and their associated compensation packages have 
relatively fewer households who are broadly unaffected. Most low-income 
households gain from these packages, and most high-income households 
lose. As the compensation packages are deliberately skewed towards 
lower-income households, this is unsurprising. Despite this, however, the 
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compensation packages do not eliminate low-income losers completely, 
demonstrating how difficult it is to completely compensate all low-income 
households when a carbon tax is introduced.
In Figure 8, it can be seen that most low-income households gain and 
most high-income households lose, while fewer households are broadly 
unaffected.
Figure 8: Winners and losers by income decile from large carbon tax 
without transport and associated compensation package
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Notes and sources: as for Figure 2
In Figure 9, too, most low-income households gain and most high-income 
households lose.
Figure 9: Winners and losers by income decile from small carbon tax with 
transport and associated compensation package
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This chapter has shown 
that it is possible 
to use the revenue 
from a carbon tax 
to compensate low-
income households 
for the carbon tax 
payments they have 
to make in a way that 
leaves lower-income 
groups better off 
overall (and higher-
income groups worse 
off overall) on average.
In Figure 10, a very similar pattern is seen: most low-income households 
gain and most high-income households lose.
Figure 10: Winners and losers by income decile from large carbon tax with 
transport and associated compensation package
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Notes and sources: as for Figure 2
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that it is possible to use the revenue from a carbon 
tax to compensate low-income households for the carbon tax payments 
they have to make in a way that leaves lower-income groups better off 
overall (and higher-income groups worse off overall) on average. However, 
it is not possible to eliminate low-income losers completely although, as 
the next chapter demonstrates, almost all of those entitled to Universal 
Credit do not lose out overall from the introduction of the large carbon tax. 
The relatively few low-income households that do lose out are usually not 
entitled to benefits. In some cases this is because they have considerable 
savings or other assets which mean that they are not entitled to Universal 
Credit, perhaps suggesting that they have only a temporarily low income. In 
others, it is because they are households of students, who are generally not 
entitled to benefits. 
The next chapter discusses the characteristics of the winners and losers 
from the carbon taxes in more detail.
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5 WINNERS AND 
LOSERS
The outputs of TAXBEN were analysed to explore 
the distributional impacts of the different carbon 
pricing scenarios and compensation packages. 
Given the marginal difference between the two 
policy scenarios (i.e. the ‘limited policy’ scenario that 
only included those policies where the costs and 
outputs were already fairly certain, and the ‘all policy’ 
scenario that had to make assumptions about the 
effects of other policies – see Chapter 3) only the 
‘all policy’ scenario results have been analysed.
Households are categorised as ‘winners’, ‘losers’ or ‘broadly unaffected’ 
according to the net impact (‘overall gain’) of the carbon tax and 
compensation packages (see Box 1 on page 26).
Overall winners and losers
Applying the CPF to gas and non-metered fuels only (small carbon tax) and 
recycling the revenue through TAXBEN results in the majority of households 
(57%) being ’broadly unaffected’ (see Table 5). Furthermore, for those that 
are classed as winners or losers, the net change experienced is less than  
+/-£100 per year on average. The 2017 count is based on ONS projections 
for population and household numbers in that year.
However, combining this carbon taxation scenario with a change in the 
VAT rate (but still excluding transport) presents a very different result, with 
over half of all households now appearing worse off (see Table 5 and Figure 
11); the average annual net loss is much greater, at just under £170. There 
is a simultaneous increase in the number of households considered to be 
winning, however, and the mean annual net gain they experience under this 
scenario is notably higher, at nearly £250 (see Table 5).
30
Table 5: Winners and losers under all carbon taxation scenarios (weighted 
for 2017 household count)
Carbon taxation scenario  Count % Mean ‘net 
gain’
Small CT non-transport  
(CPF on gas & non-metered 
fuels only)
Loser 5,944,162 21% -£79
Broadly unaffected 15,962,165 57% -£8
Winner 6,191,192 22% £92
Large CT non-transport  
(CPF on gas & non-metered 
fuels & VAT rate change)
Loser 15,178,303 54% -£168
Broadly unaffected 2,766,088 10% -£7
Winner 10,153,128 36% £245
Small CT inc. transport  
(CPF on gas and transport)
Loser 9,473,495 34% -£175
Broadly unaffected 8,028,923 29% -£1
Winner 10,595,101 38% £164
Large CT inc. transport  
(CPF on gas and transport & 
VAT rate change)
Loser 15,552,388 55% -£262
Broadly unaffected 1,607,874 6% -£10
Winner 10,937,257 39% £380
Figure 11: Proportion of households winning and losing overall under each 
carbon tax scenario
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This pattern of results under the small and large CT scenarios continues 
when transport emissions are included (see Figure 12). The maximum 
taxation scenario modelled here – CPF on gas, non-metered fuels and 
transport, and a change in the VAT rate to 20% – suggests that over half 
of households will experience a net loss overall, of over £260 a year on 
average, while just under two-fifths (39%) would stand to win, with an 
average net annual gain of £380.
Designing carbon taxation to protect low-income households
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Figure 12: Average net gain/loss of winning and losing households under 
each scenario
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Distributional impacts
By income decile
The average annual amount of tax paid by the different income groups under 
each of the modelled scenarios is shown below in Figure 13. The pattern 
mirrors that of the distribution of household and transport emissions – i.e.
Figure 13: Mean annual carbon tax paid under each scenario by disposable 
equivalised income decile
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Including transport 
and both of the large 
carbon taxation 
scenarios reverses this 
trend: under these 
scenarios revenue 
raised through the 
taxation is higher, 
enabling the funding of 
compensation packages 
sufficient to ‘protect’ 
low-income households 
from the tax burden.
Designing carbon taxation to protect low-income households
the lowest-income groups emit, and therefore pay, the least on average. 
Including transport in the carbon tax notably strengthens the trend of 
an increasing amount of tax paid from the poorest to the richest decile 
group (because the higher-income groups have notably higher transport 
emissions).  
However, under the small carbon tax without transport scenario, while 
the lowest income groups pay the least in carbon tax on average, the impact 
of the compensation packages is limited (due to the limited revenue raised 
under this scenario) to the extent that the lowest four deciles experience 
an overall average net loss (see Figure 14), albeit this loss is less than £50 
per year on average which is why the vast majority of households under this 
scenario are ‘broadly unaffected’ (see Table 5). 
Including transport and both of the large carbon taxation scenarios 
reverses this trend: under these scenarios revenue raised through the 
taxation is higher, enabling the funding of compensation packages sufficient 
to ‘protect’ low-income households from the tax burden. As such, the lower-
income deciles experience an overall net gain on average, while the higher-
income deciles experience a net loss (see Figure 14).
Figure 14: Mean annual net gain/loss under each scenario with 
compensation by equivalised income decile
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The overall proportion of winners/losers, the distribution of average annual 
carbon tax and net gain/loss by income decile shown above masks much 
within-decile variation (see Table 6 and Figures 15–18). For example, while 
overall the majority of households are ‘broadly unaffected’ under the small 
carbon tax (without transport) – and indeed this scenario has the lowest 
proportion of losing households of all the scenarios modelled – the 
distribution of winners and losers by income decile presents a regressive 
picture (see Figure 15): around 40% of the lowest decile is classed as losing, 
while a similar proportion of the upper-income deciles is classed as winning 
(albeit by little more than £100 per year on average).
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Table 6: Proportion of winners and losers by income decile under each scenario
Small CT no transport Large CT no transport
Loser % Broadly 
unaffected %
Winner % Loser % Broadly 
unaffected %
Winner %
 1 45 54 1 15 13 72
 2 33 65 2 11 11 78
 3 29 66 5 22 12 66
 4 25 66 9 43 9 49
 5 17 66 17 54 8 38
 6 16 59 25 66 9 25
 7 13 52 36 71 10 18
 8 9 49 42 80 11 9
 9 6 47 46 86 10 4
10 19 44 37 92 7 1
Total 21 57 22 54 10 36
Small CT with transport Large CT with transport
Loser % Broadly 
unaffected %
Winner % Loser Broadly 
unaffected %
Winner %
 1 14 17 6 15 6 79
 2 8 16 76 10 4 86
 3 14 22 64 19 6 75
 4 21 31 48 40 7 53
 5 29 31 39 54 6 40
 6 36 36 28 67 7 26
 7 41 36 23 76 6 18
 8 49 36 14 85 6 9
 9 56 33 11 91 5 4
10 68 26 5 96 3 1
Total 34 29 38 55 6 39
Figure 15: Proportion of winners and losers (left axis) and mean net gain (for 
winners) and loss (for losers) (right axis): Small CT no transport
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Figure 16: Proportion of winners and losers (left axis) and mean net gain (for 
winners) and loss (for losers) (right axis): Large CT no transport
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Figure 17: Proportion of winners and losers (left axis) and mean net gain (for 
winners) and loss (for losers) (right axis): Small CT with transport
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With compensation packages applied under the large carbon tax with 
transport scenario, the results appear highly progressive. The majority of 
low-income households appear to be winning under this scenario, and by 
some £350 a year on average, while the majority of households in the 
upper-income deciles lose by a similar amount (see Figure 18).
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Figure 18: Proportion of winners and losers (left axis) and mean net gain (for 
winners) and loss (for losers) (right axis): Large CT with transport
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Results by other socio-demographics
Figures 19–26 show (for four different socio-demographic descriptors:22 
tenure, dwelling type, age of Household Reference Person (HRP) and 
household composition):
•	 Mean annual carbon tax paid (left hand axis, bars) against mean annual 
household emissions (right-hand axis, lines) from household fuels and all 
sources respectively (left-hand graph); and 
•	 Mean net gain/loss when the revenue from the carbon tax is used to 
distribute a compensation package (right-hand graph).
This shows that, on the whole, the higher carbon-tax payers (i.e. the higher-
emitting households) experience a net financial loss on average, while 
low-emitting groups experience an average net gain. However, the overall 
‘average’ picture masks much variation within these groups. This is illustrated 
by the pattern within tenures and dwelling types (see Figures 19–22). For 
example, properties owned outright appear as the second-highest-taxed 
group, but experience less than a £50 net loss on average, suggesting many 
of these high-emitting households are receiving compensation. The impact 
on social tenants is likely to be a factor of both their lower income levels 
and their eligibility for compensation, and to reflect the fact that social 
housing typically has higher levels of energy efficiency (due to regulatory 
requirements such as the Decent Homes standard), affording some 
protection from a carbon tax on household emissions.
Similarly, semi-detached houses have the second-highest average carbon 
tax, but their average net change is negligible. This suggests that there is 
much variation in the level of compensation received within this household 
type – i.e. that the high rate of tax paid by some semi-detached households 
is ‘cancelled out’ by the level of compensation received by others, reflecting 
the different incomes, socio-economic status, number of occupants etc. 
within this broad housing category. 
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Conclusion
Table 6 provides an overview of the impact of the four taxation scenarios 
by income deciles. The small carbon tax with transport has the highest 
proportion of households that are winners or broadly unaffected (67%), 
which may provide a rationale for its implementation over the others. 
However, compared to the large carbon tax without transport there are 
lower proportions of low-income households winning in the bottom four 
deciles. Transport is already heavily taxed, and adding a further level of 
taxation to petrol and diesel is almost certain to be politically unacceptable, 
despite the proven ability of the tax and benefits system to compensate low-
income households.
The analysis by different socio-demographic variables presented gives 
an indication of the distributional impacts of the carbon taxation scenarios. 
In particular, the scenarios generally result in significant increases in energy 
costs for families living in larger properties that they themselves own. Lone 
parents and single elderly people tend to gain from the scenarios, which is 
likely to be politically acceptable as they are a key group of concern in terms 
of fuel poverty.
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6 DETAILED 
CHARACTERISATION 
OF WINNERS AND 
LOSERS
The previous chapter highlighted how the average 
annual carbon tax may mask within-group variations. 
This chapter seeks to explore and identify defining 
characteristics of key winning and losing groups 
of households to help clarify the key factors in 
assessing where compensation is needed. 
The Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detector (CHAID) is a classification 
method which seeks to differentiate categorical ‘predictor’ variables with 
respect to their influence upon a single dependent variable – in this case 
the categorical variable representing ‘overall gain’ (see Box 1, page 26). This 
results in clusters, or ‘nodes’, of cases with similar defining characteristics  
to which a predicted value for the dependent variable is assigned. This 
method can enable grouping characteristics to be identified among winners 
and losers.
CHAID analysis has the advantage that it enables more detailed 
scrutiny of the socio-demographics of households in each category, 
while maintaining a sufficient number of cases (set at 200 in the normally 
weighted dataset) to give reliable estimates of values.
Four different CHAID models are run here, where the dependent variable 
being modelled is the proportion of ‘winners’, ‘losers’ and those ‘broadly 
unaffected’ under each of the carbon taxation and compensation package 
scenarios modelled. 
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Small carbon tax without transport scenario
This taxation scenario raises some £1.9 billion. The compensation package 
includes: an increase in personal allowance to £10,000; no increase in 
Universal Credit; an increase in pension credit by £15 for both singles and 
couples; and an increase in the State Pension by £15 per year (see Table 4).
Running CHAID analysis on the results of the small carbon taxation 
(without transport) scenario (CPF on gas and non-metered fuels only) 
correctly identifies 66% of cases (see Table 7), to give a total count of  
4.3 million losing households (compared to the actual count of 5.9 million). 
Predictor variables used in the model (i.e. variables that the model identified 
as having a statistically significant difference with respect to the dependent 
variable) are shown in Box 2.
Table 7: Results of CHAID on small carbon tax without transport scenario 
outputs
Predicted
Loser No overall 
change
Winner Percent 
Correct
O
bs
er
ve
d Loser 2,425,298 3,153,895 364,121 41%
No overall change 1,919,390 11,792,569 2,251,054 74%
Winner 66,272 1,801,640 4,323,280 70%
Overall Percentage 16% 60% 25% 66%
Box 2: Variables selected as predictors in the CHAID model on 
small carbon tax without transport scenario outputs
•	 Household composition
•	 Universal Credit recipient
•	 Tenure
•	 Category of dwelling
•	 Number of children
•	 Heating fuel,
•	 Age of HRP (banded)
•	 Sex of HRP
•	 Govt. Office Region
•	 Number of adults
Cross-tabulating the nodes created in the CHAID analysis with socio-
demographic variables in the LCF dataset helps to identify the underlying 
drivers for winning and losing under the small carbon taxation (without 
transport) scenario. Table 8 summarises the key characteristics of the most 
significant winners and losers (i.e. the nodes with the highest or lowest  
mean overall gain respectively). More detailed descriptions of each group  
are included in Appendix 1 (see http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/ 
project_detail/419). 
Summary of losing nodes
The most significant losing nodes are: working couples with children, on 
Universal Credit; lone parents in medium-sized gas-heated houses, eligible 
for Universal Credit; low-income single elderly people in smaller detached 
houses in more rural areas, not eligible for Universal Credit; elderly couples 
without children who own their home outright, not on Universal 
Designing carbon taxation to protect low-income households
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Credit; retired couples in larger detached houses in more rural areas who 
own their home outright, not eligible for Universal Credit; very low-income 
lone parents, not working, in medium-sized terraced local authority (LA)/
Housing Authority (HA) houses, eligible for Universal Credit; very low-
income single middle-aged adults (under pension age), not working, in small 
urban terraced houses, private or LA rented, eligible for Universal Credit; and 
lower-income pensioner singles or couples in medium-sized houses with gas 
heating, mainly in urban areas. As already noted, these groups tend to lose 
because, as largely non-taxpayers, they do not benefit from the increased 
personal income tax allowances which are the main form of recycling the 
carbon tax revenues in this scenario, there being only a small increase in the 
pension and no increase in Universal Credit. Although none of these groups 
loses on average more than £55 per year, many of them are in the groups 
categorised as ‘vulnerable to fuel poverty’ and as such even small increases 
would therefore be a cause of concern to be addressed through other 
measures if possible. This is considered in Chapter 7.
Summary of winning nodes
CHAID designated 11 different nodes entirely as winning (some 6.9 million 
households). Of these, seven have a mean annual net gain greater than 
£52 for the small carbon tax without transport scenario (and therefore are 
considered to be winning according to our definition). These groups are 
dominated by higher-income households, all of whom are likely to benefit 
from the changes to the personal income tax allowance. None of them are 
on Universal Credit, so they are broadly unaffected by the fact that this is 
unchanged in this scenario. 
Large carbon tax without transport scenario
This taxation scenario raises some £6.9 billion. The compensation package 
includes: an increase in personal allowance to £10,000; an increase in 
Universal Credit amounts by £300 for singles, £200 for lone parents, £700 
for couples without children and £300 for couples with children; an increase 
in pension credit by £300 for singles and £500 for couples; and an increase 
in the state pension by £70 per year.
Running CHAID analysis on the results of the large carbon taxation 
(without transport) scenario (CPF on gas and non-metered fuels and VAT 
rate change) correctly identifies 81% of cases (see Table 9), to give a total 
count of 17 million losing households (compared to the actual count of  
15 million). Predictor variables used in the model (i.e. variables that the 
model identified as having a statistically significant difference with respect to 
the dependent variable) are shown in Box 3.
Table 9: Results of CHAID on large carbon tax (without transport) outputs
Predicted
Loser Broadly 
unaffected
Winner Percent 
Correct
O
bs
er
ve
d Loser 13,886,090 83,382 1,204,275 92%
No overall change 1,489,153 382,340 897,000 14%
Winner 1,536,017 243,140 8,376,122 82%
Overall percentage 60% 3% 37% 81%
45Detailed characterisation of winners and losers
Box 3: Variables selected as predictors in the CHAID model on 
large carbon tax (without transport) outputs
•	 Universal Credit recipient
•	 Household composition
•	 Tenure
•	 Sex of HRP 
•	 Number of children
•	 Category of dwelling
•	 Age of HRP (banded)
•	 Gas supply
•	 Number of adults
As in the analysis of the small carbon tax scenario above, cross-tabulating 
the nodes created by CHAID with socio-demographic variables in the 
LCF dataset helps to identify the underlying drivers for winning and losing 
under the second carbon taxation scenario. Table 10 summarises the key 
characteristics of the most significant winners and losers (i.e. the nodes 
with the highest or lowest mean overall gain respectively). More detailed 
descriptions of each group are included in Appendix 1 (see http://www.psi.
org.uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419). 
Summary of losing nodes
The most significant losing nodes for the large carbon tax without transport 
scenario (with an average annual net loss of around £150 to £250 across 
the node) are dominated by higher-income couples with or without children, 
in larger properties and not eligible for Universal Credit, but with high fuel 
bills and emissions – at least 70% of all these nodes are in emissions decile 
6 and above. Being higher-income households, the fact that they are losing 
out is less of a concern from a social justice point of view, but would be a 
politically sensitive issue. 
Summary of winning nodes
CHAID designated 19 different nodes entirely as winning households. Of 
these, 15 have a mean annual net gain greater than £100. Unlike under the 
small carbon tax without transport scenario, these winning groups are mainly 
lower-income households, all being eligible for Universal Credit. They are in 
urban areas and the majority have gas central heating.
Seven nodes appear as low emitters, four very notably. However,  
there are still some high-emitting households among the winners. Having 
gas central heating, they would be particularly impacted by the carbon 
taxation, but gain significantly from the increases to Universal Credit.  
The characteristics of these groups are described in more detail in  
Appendix 1 (see http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419).  
As these pen portraits show, small, low-income and multi-person rented 
properties are common among the biggest winning nodes. 
The multi-person characteristic may be apparent among winning 
households under the carbon tax scenario modelled here due to ‘economies 
of scale’ of household fuel consumption versus having several income/
benefit units in the household. The additional tax paid due to slightly higher 
fuel consumption as a result of having one or more additional adults in 
the household is outweighed by the additional income/benefits which that 
individual brings. When transport is included in the carbon tax, this winning 
phenomenon associated with multi-person households may well disappear.
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The characteristics of the biggest winning nodes under the large carbon tax 
(without transport) scenario are described in more detail in Appendix 1 (see 
http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419).
Small carbon tax with transport scenario
This taxation scenario raises some £4.6 billion. The compensation package 
includes: an increase in personal allowance to £10,000; an increase in 
Universal Credit amounts by £160 for singles, £150 for lone parents, £325 
for couples without children and £160 for couples with children; an increase 
in pension credit by £120 for singles and £300 for couples; and an increase 
in the state pension by £70 per year.
Predictor variables used in the CHAID model of the outputs for this 
taxation and compensation scenario (i.e. variables which the model identified 
as having a statistically significant difference with respect to the dependent 
variable) are shown in Box 4. Running CHAID analysis on these results 
correctly identifies 62% of cases (see Table 11), to give a total count of 
7 million losing households (compared to the actual count of 9.5 million). 
Table 12 summarises the key characteristics of the most significant winners 
and losers (i.e. the nodes with the highest or lowest mean overall gain 
respectively). More detailed descriptions of each group are included in 
Appendix 1 (see http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419).
Box 4: Variables selected as predictors in the CHAID model on 
small carbon tax with transport scenario outputs
•	 Universal Credit recipient
•	 Tenure
•	 Number of children
•	 Number of adults
•	 Household composition
•	 Government Office Region
•	 Category of dwelling
•	 Sex of HRP
•	 Age of HRP (banded)
•	 Heating fuel
•	 Gas supply
Table 11: Results of CHAID small carbon tax with transport scenario 
outputs
Predicted
Loser Broadly 
unaffected
Winner Percent 
Correct
O
bs
er
ve
d Loser 7,107,803 1,489,980 875,712 75%
No overall change 4,065,651 1,810,904 2,152,368 23%
Winner 1,061,044 1,099,740 8,434,317 80%
Overall percentage 44% 16% 41% 62%
48Designing carbon taxation to protect low-income households
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Summary of losing nodes
The most significant losing nodes for this scenario are dominated by higher-
income working-age couples in larger dwellings with gas central heating 
but in less urban areas. These characteristics in combination result in high 
average emissions from both household fuels and personal travel, hence 
they are hit hardest by the carbon tax. Being higher-income and working-
age, these households do not benefit from the adjustments to Universal 
Credit or pension; furthermore, the benefit from the shift in the income tax 
threshold appears insufficient to counteract the impact of the carbon tax.
Summary of winning nodes
CHAID designated 22 different nodes entirely as winning households  
(i.e. that have a mean annual net gain greater than £52) under the small 
carbon tax with transport scenario. These groups are dominated by lower-
income households, in smaller properties with mains gas central heating in 
urban areas. In the main they have relatively low household and transport 
emissions and hence are less affected by a carbon tax, despite having gas 
central heating. The most significant winners are also eligible for Universal 
Credit and therefore would benefit from the adjustments to the tax and 
benefit system.
Large carbon tax with transport scenario
This taxation scenario raises some £9.6 billion. The compensation package 
includes: an increase in the personal income tax allowance to £10,000; an 
increase in Universal Credit amounts by £325 for singles without children, 
£350 for lone parents, £925 for couples without children and £400 for 
couples with children; a reduced Universal Credit taper to 63% rather than 
65%; an increase in pension credit by £450 for singles and £850 for couples; 
an increase in the state pension by £100 per year.
Predictor variables used in the CHAID model of the outputs for this 
taxation and compensation scenario (i.e. variables which the model identified 
as having a statistically significant difference with respect to the dependent 
variable) are shown in Box 5. Running CHAID analysis on these results 
correctly identifies 84% of cases (see Table 13), to give a total count of  
16.7 million losing households (compared to the actual count of 15.6 million) 
and 11.4 million winning households (compared to the actual count of  
10.9 million).23 Table 14 summarises the key characteristics of the most 
significant winners and losers (i.e. the nodes with the highest or lowest mean 
overall gain respectively). More detailed descriptions of each group are 
included in Appendix 1 (see http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_
detail/419).
Box 5: Variables selected as predictors in the CHAID model on 
large carbon tax with transport outputs
•	 Universal Credit recipient
•	 Tenure
•	 Number of children
•	 Number of adults
•	 Household composition
•	 Category of dwelling
•	 Sex of HRP
•	 Age of HRP (banded)
•	 Government Office Region
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In general, wealthier 
households with higher 
emissions stand to lose, 
with a growing rural 
dimension if transport 
is included. Conversely, 
lower-income 
households living in 
smaller, socially rented 
properties stand out as 
consistent winners.
Table 13: Results of CHAID on large carbon tax with transport outputs
Predicted
Loser Broadly 
unaffected
Winner Percent 
Correct
O
bs
er
ve
d Loser 14,182,283 0 1,370,105 91%
No overall change 903,870 0 704,004 0%
Winner 1,596,072 0 9,341,185 85%
Overall percentage 59% 0% 41% 84%
Table 14 summarises the characteristics of the most significant winning and 
losing nodes for the large carbon tax with transport scenario.
Summary of losing nodes
The most significant losing nodes (with an average annual net loss of  
£266–£396 across the node) are dominated by working higher-income 
couples, with or without children, in large properties and not eligible for 
Universal Credit, but with high household fuel and transport emissions.  
Being higher-income households, the fact that they are losing out is less  
of a concern from a social justice point of view, but would be a politically 
sensitive issue, particularly given the nature of these groups (‘hard-working’ 
adults and families) and the higher average net loss compared to the other 
carbon taxation scenarios modelled (over £250 to almost £400 a year for 
the most significant losing groups).
Under the large carbon tax with transport scenario, lower-income and/
or vulnerable households (e.g. lone parents or the elderly) appear protected 
from the impacts of the carbon tax (because of a more substantial pot of 
revenue to be redistributed through the benefits system). 
There are, however, two groups of potentially vulnerable older 
households that do appear to be worse off under this scenario. These are 
mainly couples – though some 25% are single households – aged 65–74, 
who own their 3–4 bed detached houses outright. These dwellings are in 
rural areas, with gas or oil heating and have higher household emissions than 
transport. There is a spread of incomes, but a tendency towards the upper 
deciles (~25% top quintile) – see Appendix 1 at http://www.psi.org.uk/index.
php/site/project_detail/419 for full descriptions.
Summary of winning nodes
The key winning groups under the large carbon tax with transport scenario 
are dominated by: low-income families and lone parents in LA housing; 
private renters (families and single adults out of work); elderly people in LA 
electrically heated purpose-built flats (see Appendix 1 at http://www.psi.org.
uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419 for full descriptions).
Conclusion
There is considerable homogeneity in the findings from the detailed 
analysis of winners and losers under each carbon taxation scenario. In 
general, wealthier households with higher emissions stand to lose, with 
a growing rural dimension if transport is included. Conversely, lower-
income households living in smaller, socially rented properties stand out as 
consistent winners. The lower emissions of these household types are likely 
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to reflect both their (lack of) affluence and more energy efficient properties, 
testament to the legacy of previous programmes to improve social housing, 
i.e. the Decent Homes standard. 
Chapter 5 reviewed the distributional impacts of carbon taxation 
scenarios by household income and demographics. The analysis concluded 
that the large carbon tax without transport provides the best fit between 
progressivity and political acceptability. The CHAID results support this 
conclusion, with this scenario generating sufficient revenue to support a net 
gain for 10.5 million households, the majority of which are lower-income 
households eligible for Universal Credit; they are in urban areas and must 
have gas central heating.
The low-income winners nodes identified generally contain households 
that have low energy bills and emissions (and therefore pay less in carbon 
tax). However, there are still some high-emitting households among  
the winners. Having gas central heating, these higher emitters would  
be particularly impacted by the carbon taxation, but gain significantly from 
the increases to Universal Credit. As the pen portraits show, small low-
income multi-person rented properties are common among the biggest 
winning nodes. 
The most significant ‘losing’ nodes under the large carbon tax without 
transport scenario (with an average annual net loss of around £150–£250 
across the node) are dominated by higher-income couples, with or without 
children, in larger properties and not eligible for Universal Credit, but with 
high fuel bills and emissions. As mentioned above, penalising this group of 
‘hard-working families’ could be politically sensitive for the government, 
especially if the taxation package includes a levy on transport, which already 
carries a significant level of fuel duty and also adds a rural impact (i.e. where 
there are fewer alternatives to car use, a higher cost of fuel may be more 
difficult to adapt to and therefore disproportionately burden households in 
these areas).
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7 POSSIBILITIES 
FOR FURTHER 
COMPENSATING LOW-
INCOME LOSERS
Chapter 6 showed that most, but not all, low-
income losers could be compensated for the 
imposition of a carbon tax. The next stage in the 
project explored a number of ways in which further 
policy measures could reduce the number of low-
income losers. 
Low-income losers
Table 15 shows the numbers of winners and losers by income band, i.e. 
deciles 1–3 represent low incomes, 4–7 middle incomes, and 8–10 high 
incomes. The results show that approximately 1.9 million (6.9%) of the 28.1 
million households in 2017 are low-income losers under the small carbon 
tax without transport scenario, with a lower count of 1.4 million (4.8%) under 
the large carbon tax without transport scenario. Under the small carbon 
tax without transport scenario there is a higher number of low-income 
losers but the overall scale of the impact is relatively low, i.e. an average 
annual net loss of £53 (which is only marginally higher than our ‘broadly 
unaffected’ threshold). While the large taxation without transport scenario 
contains a lower number of low-income losers there is a stronger reason 
for compensation to reduce losses among low-income households as the 
average net loss is higher, i.e. £171.
Administrative feasibility of compensation measures
The government could therefore design an additional compensation package 
to ensure low-income households are protected from the adverse impacts 
of a carbon tax. Because of concern in advance that using the tax and 
benefits system may not be sufficient to adequately compensate low-income
54
Table 15: Winners and losers by income band under the two carbon 
taxation scenarios applied to household fuels
Small tax no transport Large tax without transport
Income 
band
Winning or 
losing
Count % Mean 
Overall 
Gain
Count % Mean 
Overall 
Gain
Low income Loser 1,927,654 23% -£53.10 1,357,414 16% -£171.26
Broadly 
unaffected
5,777,365 69% -£33.84 1,003,870 12% £5.09
Winner 724,778 9% -£7.44 6,068,513 72% £249.63
Middle 
income
Loser 1,696,161 15% -£53.59 6,573,394 58% -£157.82
Broadly 
unaffected
6,836,381 61% -£5.03 1,004,078 9% -£10.66
Winner 2,706,370 24% £57.88 3,661,440 33% £240.49
Higher 
income
Loser 787,145 9% -£30.36 7,242,939 86% -£175.66
Broadly 
unaffected
4,134,358 49% £6.27 760,545 9% -£19.25
Winner 3,507,307 42% £71.55 425,326 5% £216.31
households for higher energy and transport taxes, other ways to tackle the
issue were also investigated, including the idea of exemptions for certain 
types of households from the energy taxes. Key issues relating to such 
exemptions are administrative cost, complexity and feasibility. 
A range of issues relating to the administrative feasibility of different 
ways of arranging the tax and compensation mechanisms were explored. 
Firstly, we looked at the compensatory measures relevant for household 
energy, considering the mechanics of applying a carbon tax to bills – the 
idea of a rising block tax or VAT at a higher rate for consumption above a 
threshold. The main alternative we examined was the idea of exempting 
certain households from the tax – instead of compensation through benefit 
payments, eligibility for certain benefits would be used to exempt those 
households from the tax, rather like the way certain households are eligible 
for free school meals and other concessions. 
Secondly, we looked at transport duty and, in particular, concessions for 
motorists in rural areas, either by extending the Rural Fuel Duty Rebate 
scheme to areas beyond the islands that it already covers, or by reducing 
Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) for cars registered in rural areas. 
A detailed discussion of the project’s research in these areas is in 
Appendix 2 (see http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419). 
The analysis shows that the administrative problems with these additional 
measures could not be easily resolved for either household energy or 
transport, and that there would need to be compelling reasons, in terms  
of improving the distributional outcomes from carbon taxation, for them  
to be introduced. However, the analysis, particularly that documented in 
Chapter 6, showed that the great majority of low-income households 
could be compensated for the carbon tax by redistributing the revenues 
raised. It has therefore been concluded that compensation through the tax 
and benefits system would be sufficiently effective, and that the additional 
complexity involved in other approaches would not be justified. Similarly, 
applying a lower rate of VED in rural areas would also be administratively 
complex, open to abuse and would decrease the incentive to buy the most 
fuel-efficient cars, which already have zero VED.
The one exception to this conclusion of the practical infeasibility of 
supplementing compensation through the tax-benefit system with additional 
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The analysis, particularly 
that documented in 
Chapter 6, showed that 
the great majority of 
low-income households 
could be compensated 
for the carbon tax 
by redistributing the 
revenues raised.
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measures is that it would appear practical to extend the Rural Fuel Duty 
Rebate scheme from the islands to parts of the mainland in the Scottish 
Highlands. This would compensate households in those areas for the lack 
of public transport and the greater need, therefore, for car use. These 
areas also have fuel prices well above the national average, and the distance 
between petrol stations is so great that fuel tourism is unlikely. (The practical 
problem with extending the scheme to rural areas more generally is that it 
would make fuel tourism more likely.) In any case, fuel prices in the islands 
and in remote parts of the Scottish Highlands are much higher than the 
national average, but this is not generally the case in rural areas.
There are a number of other policy options that could be considered 
to try to reduce further the number of low-income losers shown in Table 
15, especially in the large carbon tax without transport scenario. Two of 
the most promising appear to be: adjustments to the Winter Fuel Payment 
(currently paid to everyone over 65, and some below 65, irrespective of 
their income) such that older, lower-income pensioners get paid more; 
and targeting of this type of pensioner to receive rebates to their fuel bills 
through the Warm Home Discount. However, as already noted, the costs 
and administrative processes related to such compensation schemes would 
also require further careful analysis, as with the measures examined in 
Appendix 2 (see http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419): 
this was outside the scope of this project.
It is worth making one final point concerning the administrative feasibility 
of compensating low-income households for disproportionate effects from 
otherwise socially desirable measures such as carbon taxes. The simple 
structure of Universal Credit makes it straightforward to increase benefit 
payments for particular kinds of family, making it easier to compensate  
all households of a particular type from measures such as carbon taxation 
than it would be with the more complicated structure of the existing  
benefits system.
Conclusion
Compensation through the mechanisms modelled in this report would be 
effective at ensuring that there would be relatively few low-income losers 
compared to the number of low-income winners, but these mechanisms 
do not eliminate the problem of low-income losers. Since nearly every 
household eligible for Universal Credit will gain anyway, the administrative 
complexity of a system of exemption from a tax increase on household 
energy could not be justified. Adjustments to Winter Fuel Payments so that 
they were targeted at older lower-income pensioners may be a feasible 
option, but this was not examined in detail. Broadening the Rural Fuel Duty 
Rebate scheme from the islands to include remote parts of the mainland 
in the Scottish Highlands would be feasible, but there would be practical 
problems with wider concessions to rural motorists.
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8 REAL AND 
MODELLED DATA
Actual changes in energy demand due to energy-
efficiency measures such as cavity-wall filling, loft 
insulation, double glazing and boiler replacement 
have been shown to vary from predictions. This is 
because of the limitations of models to accurately 
describe actual house features and household 
behaviours that would influence real-life energy 
demand. 
This ‘gap’ between actual and predicted energy demand will be a  
combination of technical, socio-behavioural, physical and environmental 
factors. In terms of savings due to a refurbishment designed to reduce 
energy demand through efficiency improvements to a dwelling’s physical 
features (i.e. fabric or heat system improvements), these are based on 
assumptions about installation quality, that occupant behaviour is consistent 
before and after, and that environmental features have not changed. These 
assumptions are a primary cause of the discrepancy between actual and 
modelled changes in energy demand, and are the result of a lack of real 
empirical evidence.
Recent studies, however, have assessed the impact of energy-efficiency 
interventions using a combination of survey data and house-level energy 
usage.24 The results have shown ‘real’ changes in demand associated with an 
energy-efficiency intervention. In a sample of houses, broadly representative 
of the UK housing stock, the changes between 2005 and 2007 were shown 
for dwellings with and without energy-efficiency interventions. Table 16 
shows these changes in absolute and percentage terms.
Table 16 shows the ‘actual’ changes for all houses with a selected 
measure. The base energy-efficiency group was the control group, without 
any measures. They had an average change of -6% in gas demand (i.e. a 
reduction of 6%) from 2005–7. This baseline change in demand will be due 
to factors such as changes in energy prices (an increase of approximately 
50% during the period) and the perceived downturn in the economic climate. 
This ‘baseline’ trend is used to establish what change would be expected 
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for dwellings with no additional efficiency measures. The table then shows 
the change in energy demand for dwellings with an installed measure: the 
effective, or ‘actual’, change, is the percentage change minus the base 
change. For example, loft insulation shows, on average across all house 
types, a 3% reduction in energy use. These actual changes also tend to 
vary by building characteristics, i.e. type, age, size etc. However, the values 
themselves tend to be lower than the modelled prediction implemented 
in DIMPSA , e.g. 15% (actual) compared to 22% (DIMPSA) for cavity-wall 
insulation and 3% (actual) compared to 10% (DIMPSA) for loft insulation 
(depending on the type of property and the level of insulation).
Table 16: Changes in energy consumption in dwellings with and without 
various energy efficiency interventions
Group 2005 – 
mean kWh
2007 – 
mean kWh
Change 
2005–
2007
Change 
2005–
2007 
(adjusted 
for base)
% Change 
2005–
2007
Base Energy 
Efficiency 
Group Individual 
Measures 2006
19,389 18,136 -1,253 - -6%
Loft insulation 21,258 19,246 -2,013 -760 -9%
Cavity wall 
insulation
20,243 17,184 -3,059 -1,806 -15%
Glazing 
Replacement
20,215 18,610 -1,605 -352 -8%
Condensing Boiler 19,305 16,573 -2,732 -1,479 -14%
Multiple Measures
Cavity + Loft 20,649 17,884 -2,765 -1,511 -13%
Cavity + Glazing 19,586 16,784 -2,802 -1,549 -14%
Cavity + Boiler 18,197 14,692 -3,505 -2,252 -19%
Loft + Glazing 20,194 18,425 -1,770 -517 -9%
Loft + Boiler 20,538 17,659 -2,879 -1,626 -14%
Glazing + Boiler 19,139 16,771 -2,368 -1,115 -12%
It should be noted that the ‘actual’ change in demand includes a host 
of factors, such as how people may change their energy use in practice 
following an intervention, affecting the levels of change associated with a 
measure. These ‘in use’ factors result in the predicted savings not being met. 
However, it should be noted that predicted savings are idealised and do not 
include these ‘in use’ factors that, to date, are poorly understood. However, 
as this is an average, there are still households that will achieve the expected 
savings; a better understanding of those households could offer insights 
into how to address the savings gap. The implication is that models, such as 
DIMPSA or the DECC Green Deal model, may need to apply these ‘in use’ 
factors to alter the savings for efficiency measures to reflect the average 
behaviour associated with past measures.
Using the above analysis from DECC’s NEED report and a selection of 
house features drawn from the Home Energy Efficiency Database (HEED),25 
a set of factors is established for a selection of house types – defined by 
dwelling age, type, size and tenure – which can be applied to the DIMPSA 
model outputs for sensitivity testing. The effect is to reduce the impact that 
Real and modelled data
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This effect, commonly 
referred to as ‘rebound’ 
or ‘take-back’, means 
that models used 
to predict energy 
savings following an 
efficiency measure 
may overestimate the 
savings.
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a modelled measure has on a household’s energy demand. In some cases this 
will have the effect of households maintaining a higher than expected fuel 
demand and therefore paying more tax on their fuel consumption. 
Conclusion 
The savings associated with energy-efficiency measures are, in reality, 
subject to a host of factors that influence the level of change achieved 
compared to modelled approaches. This effect, commonly referred to as 
‘rebound’ or ‘take-back’, means that models used to predict energy savings 
following an efficiency measure may overestimate the savings. In the cases 
examined in this report, the implication is that fuel bills will not be reduced as 
much as expected, thus the level of taxation may be higher than otherwise 
modelled. As part of the analysis, the ‘in use’ factors associated with the 
above measures were included as part of the sensitivity testing in order to 
understand the implications of the savings gap. 
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9 SENSITIVITY 
ANALYSIS: IMPACT 
OF ENERGY TRENDS, 
COMFORT-TAKING 
AND POPULATION 
GROWTH
There are a number of assumptions and a 
standardised set of inputs that are applied in 
DIMPSA for assessing the impacts of government 
policies on household energy consumption. These 
assumptions have important implications for the 
results obtained. 
At the beginning of this study, we explored the impact of running the 
model with different policy assumptions – the ‘all policy’ and ‘limited policy’ 
scenarios. This showed that there was little difference in the overall impacts 
on total household emissions, hence the remainder of the modelling and 
analysis applied the ‘all policy’ model results only.
To assess the implications of other model assumptions/omissions, 
sensitivity analysis was undertaken to explore the impact on results of the 
following three key model parameters: trends in energy demand and product 
policy, comfort-taking and population change. This chapter summarises the 
report on the sensitivity analysis. For the full discussion, see Appendix 3 
(http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419).
Trends in energy demand and product policy
Unlike the long-term trend for energy use in the home – which shows 
an increase in total and per capita gas and electricity consumption (from 
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1981 to 2009) – the short-term weather-corrected trend shows a decline 
for both fuels, i.e. as weather has been controlled, so the trend is non-
weather-dependant.26 The trend is more pronounced for electricity, which 
may demonstrate some success of, for example, recent changes to lighting 
regulations. The trend occurred despite, during the ten-year period from 
2001–10 inclusive, an increase in the number of households in the UK of 
7.2%. During this time the population (number of persons) increased by 
5.3%, while the number of persons per household fell slightly from 2.41 to 
2.36 on average. The short-term trend therefore indicates that household 
energy demand is on the decline, despite growth in the number of people 
and households. Energy use is falling both per person and per household, 
and overall. 
In their recent modelling of the impacts of product policy (PP, i.e. 
regulated standards for improvements in the energy efficiency of consumer 
products) on consumer energy bills, the government and Climate Change 
Committee (CCC) applied the same assumptions, which include the most 
recent savings that stem from developments in EU Product Policy.27 The 
product policy savings allow for growth in demand resulting from population 
change and a reduction in demand resulting from improved product efficiency 
and changing usage patterns. It also assumes some increase in gas demand 
due to the ‘heat replacement effect’.28 The resulting figures are shown in  
Table 17.
The analysis undertaken in this study pre-dates these latest assumptions 
from DECC and uses more conservative estimates of product policy savings 
(see Table 17). Although more conservative, these assumed values – which 
are spread across all households in the dataset – still result in a significant 
change in household gas and electricity demand. An alternative, even more 
conservative, method for modelling the underlying trend in consumer 
energy demand was therefore explored, to assess the implications of these 
product policy assumptions for the results obtained in this study. 
The alternative approach removes product policy from the model and 
instead takes estimates for changes in demand derived from trends in 
domestic electricity and gas consumption over the previous five years  
(2005–10) from Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics (DUKES).29 
This gives a change in 2020 of -10.45 TWhs for electricity and +0.97 TWhs 
for gas, as shown in Table 17. The average annual change implied by these 
figures was then applied to the energy consumption values in the modelling 
baseline year (2010), and energy consumption projected forward to 2017. 
Table 17: Assumed changes in total household energy demand in 2020 due 
to product efficiency improvements and heat replacement effect
Change in total 
electricity demand in 
2020
Change in total gas 
demand in 2020
DECC and CCC latest PP 
assumptions
-18.47 TWhs +8.96 TWhs
Assumptions used in this 
study
-12.74 TWhs +7.15 TWhs
Adjusted using energy 
trends
-10.45 TWhs +0.97 TWhs
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The consumption of gas increases significantly for the product policy 
scenarios above due to the heat replacement effect. The short-term trend 
for gas use does not reflect this; in other words, as electricity use falls we 
do not necessarily see an increase in gas use. This may be due to the fall 
in electricity being associated with behavioural changes or households 
choosing to accept the slight decrease in ambient temperature due 
to improved lighting standards and product efficiency. And if all of the 
electricity savings are due to more efficient products, this could suggest an 
additional trend for cooler houses. The standard modelling of product policy 
may therefore be over-exaggerating an increase in householders’ heating 
fuel consumption as a result of the heat replacement effect.
However, there are a multitude of additional factors that could be 
responsible for this trend that cannot be identified from this analysis. If we 
are to truly understand trends for energy consumption in the home then 
data on actual consumption and demand temperatures must become more 
freely available. 
Comfort-taking
To explore the impact of government policies on household energy 
consumption, DIMPSA models the deployment of sustainable energy 
measures across the housing stock. In doing so, DIMPSA has a set of 
standard inputs that are applied for modelling the savings resulting from 
measures. These are in line with DECC’s own modelling assumptions. 
However, research has suggested that, in practice, households may take 
more benefit from household energy-efficiency measures in the form of 
comfort (i.e. higher room temperatures) than is generally assumed. If this 
is the case, the model will be overestimating the impact of measures on 
household energy consumption (i.e. the savings and emissions reductions will 
be lower than expected). 
Research described in Chapter 8 of this report explores the ‘real’ impact 
of energy-efficiency measures on household energy consumption. The 
results from this analysis, described in more detail in Appendix 3 (see http://
www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419), found an increased level 
of comfort-taking (and therefore lower energy and emissions savings) 
than assumed in the model. The assumed level of comfort-taking for key 
household insulation measures (lofts and walls) and boilers was adjusted in 
DIMPSA (see Table 18). 
Table 18: Energy savings, standard and adjusted for increased  
comfort-taking
Insulation Standard Adjusted
Cavity wall insulation 19% 5%
Solid wall insulation (internal) 25% 16%
Solid wall insulation (external) 51% 33%
Loft insulation (full) 10% 1%
Loft insulation (top up) 4% 1%
The model was re-run with these adjusted values, and without the assumed 
product policy savings as described above, to produce a new set of impacts 
of government energy and climate policies on consumer energy bills to 
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2020. These outputs were then compared with the results derived from the 
standard modelling assumptions. The results suggest that the government’s 
standard modelling of energy policies has an over-optimistic view of the 
derived carbon savings and potential reductions to energy bills as a result of 
the installation of energy-efficiency measures. 
Allowing for population change
The IFS TAXBEN model uses ONS population projections to create new 
weights in the dataset to mimic projected population change within the 
modelling timeframe (i.e. to 2017).30 The weightings are designed to ensure 
that the population profile of the dataset used in this study corresponds with 
ONS figures for 2010 and 2017 (see Table 19). 
Table 19: Weighting the survey data to allow for population growth 
(counts represent households in thousands)
Household type Baseline  
Survey 
population
2010 
population
2017 
population
Couple, no children, under 60 4,050 4,264 4,578
Couple, no children, over 60 4,091 4,482 5,029
Couples with children 4,722 4,828 4,919
Lone parent 1,394 1,601 1,640
Multi-person house 3,139 3,123 3,196
One adult, under 60 3,105 3,734 3,827
One adult, over 60 3,706 4,607 4,906
Total households 24,207 26,641 28,098
Total persons 57,012 60,463 63,323
TAXBEN uses these weightings to give an accurate reflection of the demand 
for welfare benefits in 2017. To ensure consistency, the Baseline Survey 
population in DIMPSA was weighted to arrive at a new 2017 population that 
took account of population growth (as shown in Table 19) in the analysis 
of the impacts of government policy on household emissions in 2017. This 
has implications for the level of emissions reductions resulting from policy 
impacts (as a direct result of the new weightings increasing the number of 
people and households represented in the dataset). 
Results of sensitivity analysis
The results of the sensitivity analysis on overall household emissions in 
2017 are shown in Table 20. Figures in brackets show the difference in total 
household emissions in 2017 compared to the standard modelling scenario 
(taking account of projected population growth).
The results, which are presented in more detail in Appendix 3 (see  
http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419), show that:
•	 Emissions reductions resulting from policy impacts appear greater 
when no population growth is assumed (i.e. using the Baseline Survey 
population). Re-weighting the dataset to mimic ONS projections for 
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population change to 2017 results in higher estimates of carbon 
emissions and energy demand in the modelling year.
Table 20: Impact of survey weighting and policy/model assumptions on 
emissions results
Modelling scenario Count of HHS Residential 
emissions 
(MtCO2)
% Change 
in emissions 
on 1990
UK 1990 Baseline emissions  155.5 –
Modelling baseline year  
(as shown in Table 2) (survey weight)
24,206,750 128.3 17.50%
Row A: standard outputs  
(as shown in Table 2)
2017 –  All policies, standard 
assumptions  
+ population growth (2017 
population in Appendix 3, 
Table 37 – see http://www.
psi.org.uk/index.php/site/
project_detail/419)
28,097,519 127.4 18.00%
Row B: sensitivity analysis 1  
2017 –  All policies, standard 
assumptions  
+ survey population, Table 37 
(i.e. no population growth)
24,206,750 112.1
(
➜
15.3)
27.90%
Row C: sensitivity analysis 2 
2017 –  Row A (standard outputs 
assumptions, as shown  
in Table 2) 
+ without PP 
+ comfort-taking adjusted 
+ population growth (2017 
population in Table 37)             
28,097,519 134.3
( ➜ 22.2)
13.60%
Row D: sensitivity analysis 3
2017 –  Row C: (standard outputs 
assumptions, as shown in  
Table 2, without PP, plus 
adjusted comfort-taking) 
+ short-term energy demand 
trends built in 
+ population growth (2017 
population in Table 37)
28,097,519 130.6
( ➜ 18.5)
16.00%
Note: figures in brackets show change from standard outputs, Row A
•	 However, the projected weighting to 2017 is likely to overestimate 
emissions in that year (and therefore underestimate emissions savings) as 
emissions do not necessarily grow at the same rate as the population (i.e. 
there may be more people who are using less). Thus, we might expect the 
‘real’ result to lie somewhere between the two (i.e. between the totals of 
Row A and Row B).
•	 Increasing comfort-taking rates of some key energy-efficiency measures 
deployed in the modelling, and removing the assumed impacts of product 
policy, reduces the level of emissions reduction achieved in 2017 by 
some 4% compared to standard model assumptions for comfort-taking 
(the difference between Row A and Row C).
•	 Increasing comfort-taking rates of some key energy-efficiency measures 
and incorporating short-term energy demand trends reduces the level of 
emissions reduction achieved in 2017 by some 2%, compared to standard 
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Under the sensitivity 
analysis modelling 
scenario that adjusts 
for the performance 
of sustainable energy 
measures and recent 
trends in domestic 
energy demand […], 
household emissions 
are 18.5 MTCO2 higher 
in 2017 than under 
the standard modelling 
scenario.
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model assumptions for comfort-taking and without energy trends 
included (the difference between Row A and Row D).
•	 The level of reduction in emissions achieved under all of these different 
modelling scenarios is still significantly lower than that required by 
the CCC in its latest calculations, which suggest a need for emissions 
reductions of 32% by the end of 2017 (see Appendix 3 at http://www.
psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_detail/419 for the detail of these 
calculations).
Conclusions and implications for carbon tax analysis
The sensitivity analysis presented above shows that model inputs and 
assumptions about energy demand trends, the performance of energy-
efficiency measures, product policy, comfort-taking and population growth 
have significant implications for the estimated impact of government policies 
on household emissions. The data on the actual performance of measures  
in situ suggests that expectations that policy will deliver the claimed savings 
are unrealistic. 
DECC’s Annual Energy Statement (referred to as the AES31) analyses 
the distributional impacts of UK climate-change policies. The research 
applies the same comfort-taking factor as this study, i.e. 15% for any 
heat consumption reduction measure, renewable heat pump or insulation 
measure. However, the recent DECC Green Deal and ECO consultation 
included additional in-use factors for measures’ performance and installation 
quality. The additional factors increase comfort-taking to approximately 
50%. These factors are based on an analysis of measures’ performance data 
by Sanders and Phillipson.32 The more recent analysis of measures and policy 
performance is therefore adapting to the actual performance of energy-
efficiency measures. 
In the context of this study specifically, the level of emissions in 2017 will 
affect the amount of revenue raised in carbon tax and how much individual 
households have to pay. Under the sensitivity analysis modelling scenario 
that adjusts for the performance of sustainable energy measures and recent 
trends in domestic energy demand (rather than incorporating assumptions 
about product policy, i.e. Row D in Table 20), household emissions are 18.5 
MTCO2 higher in 2017 than under the standard modelling scenario. In the 
context of carbon taxation, these higher emissions translate into a higher 
carbon tax paid (calculated for the ‘small carbon tax without transport’ 
scenario in Appendix 3, see http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/project_
detail/419). This has further implications for the level of revenue generated 
from the tax, which could be recycled to further assist in compensating 
low-income or vulnerable households. It also potentially strengthens the 
rationale for an additional increase in energy costs through taxation, as this 
may in turn stimulate additional behavioural change resulting in the improved 
performance of measures. 
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10 CONCLUSIONS 
Basic principles of public finance posit the 
undesirability of environmentally perverse subsidies 
and different rates of environmental taxes, such 
as carbon taxes, across different sectors of the 
economy. In the UK, both of these economic 
distortions are in evidence in the absence of carbon 
taxation from the use of gas for household heating, 
and in the low rate of VAT on the home use of 
energy more broadly. 
Using the recently developed household energy model, DIMPSA, this project 
set out to examine how to design an environmental tax reform that would 
remove these distortions and give further incentives to reduce the carbon 
emissions from transport, while also protecting low-income households from 
negative impacts.
Four different designs of environmental tax reform were modelled. On 
the tax side, these scenarios extended the Carbon Price Floor (CPF) to the 
use of household energy and other non-metered fuels (‘small carbon tax’), 
and raised the rate of VAT on household energy from 5% to 20% (‘large 
carbon tax’). Transport taxes were then levied on two scenarios, giving four 
overall (small/large carbon tax with/without transport).
On the compensation side, Income Tax Personal Allowances were first 
raised to £10,000 per year, then remaining revenues were used to increase 
the basic State Pension, Pension Credit and Universal Credit. The modelling 
year, 2017, was chosen as that is the year in which Universal Credit will be 
fully implemented. It is worth noting that the introduction of Universal Credit 
makes compensating low-income households for policies such as carbon 
taxation much easier than under the present patchwork system of multiple 
overlapping benefits.
The project found that only the design that directed most of the 
revenues from the tax measures to increasing the Income Tax Personal 
Allowance (and increased benefits very little) made low-income households 
worse off on average (this was the ‘small carbon tax without transport’ 
scenario). The other three designs made most low-income households 
better off on average.
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The modelling found that using Universal Credit and Pension Credit (as 
well as increasing the Income Tax Personal Allowance and the basic State 
Pension) would redistribute the tax revenue so that most (69% to 86%) 
households in the bottom two deciles would gain from higher taxation of 
household energy, and few (8% to 15%) of these households would lose. 
Such a tax reform is therefore very progressive overall.
Very few households claiming Universal Credit or Pension Credit would 
lose, either. Existing means-tested benefits and tax credits for those of 
working age already have relatively high rates of take-up, often in excess of 
90%, at least for those on lower incomes. The government hopes that the 
introduction of Universal Credit will increase take-up further because people 
will no longer have to apply for separate benefits, only for Universal Credit. 
However, Pension Credit has a lower rate of take-up, particularly among 
pensioners with small amounts of private income. Because the modelling 
assumed take-up by all eligible households – although in fact not everyone 
eligible for the benefits claims them – more low-income households, and 
particularly more lower-income pensioners, will perhaps lose out from the 
introduction of a carbon tax than we estimate here.
Almost all of those entitled to Universal Credit do not lose out overall 
from the introduction of the large carbon tax. However, there are some low-
income households that will not be eligible for Universal Credit or Pension 
Credit. This is usually because they either have too much in savings or other 
assets (meaning they are not entitled to Universal Credit) perhaps suggesting 
that they have only a temporarily low income, or that they are households of 
students, who are generally not entitled to benefits. 
The project also examined in detail which kinds of household ‘win’ or 
‘lose’. The most significant losing groups identified through CHAID analysis 
are dominated by working higher-income couples with or without children, 
in larger properties and not eligible for Universal Credit, but with high 
household fuel and transport emissions. Being higher-income households, 
the fact that they are losing out is less of a concern from a social justice 
point of view, but could be a politically sensitive issue given the nature of 
these groups (‘hard-working’ adults and families). In the modelling, we have 
tried to protect low-income households, meaning that most of them gain 
from the packages we have simulated. That inevitably means that there have 
to be higher-income losers to keep each package revenue-neutral. 
Because of concern at the start of the project that using the tax and 
benefits system may not be sufficient to adequately compensate low-income 
households for higher energy and transport taxes, other ways to tackle the 
issue were also investigated, including the idea of exemptions for certain 
types of household from the energy taxes. However, the results of the 
project have shown that compensation through tax and benefits would be 
sufficiently effective to compensate low-income households, and that the 
extra distributional benefits derived from other approaches would not justify 
the additional administrative complexity involved.
The research has therefore shown that higher taxation of household 
energy and transport in the UK can be implemented in such a way that, 
through appropriate recycling of the tax revenues, most lower-income 
households could be made better off rather than worse off. 
The government could therefore choose to introduce a carbon tax on 
the household use of gas and non-metered fuels in the knowledge that the 
tax and benefits system can protect low-income households. Furthermore, 
the lower rate of VAT on fuel could be ended, removing the environmentally 
perverse subsidy that this represents, with the tax and benefits system again 
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protecting low-income householders. The impact on consumption of these 
tax measures on energy costs has not been modelled. In recent years, rapidly 
increasing prices have not reduced consumption significantly; however, the 
carbon tax measures detailed in this report would be expected to receive 
high-profile media coverage and as such might stimulate action. 
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Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) – technology attempting to prevent the 
release of large quantities of CO2 from fossil-fuel use in power generation 
and other industries into the atmosphere by capturing CO2, transporting it 
and, ultimately, pumping it into underground geologic formations to securely 
store it away.
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) – a UK government obligation 
that requires all domestic energy suppliers with a customer base in excess 
of 250,000 to make savings in the amount of CO2 emitted by households. 
Suppliers meet this target by promoting the uptake of low-carbon energy 
solutions to household energy consumers. The programme was originally  
to run from April 2008 to March 2011, but it was extended to the end  
of 2012.
Carbon price – the cost of emitting a ton of carbon dioxide or its equivalent 
under a carbon tax or an emissions trading system.
Carbon Price Floor (CPF) – the carbon price set by the European Union 
(EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) has not been certain enough or 
high enough to encourage sufficient investment in low-carbon electricity 
generation in the UK. The CPF is a pricing mechanism that has been created 
to set a minimum price for carbon emissions in the traded EU ETS market 
for carbon from the electricity generation sector, starting at £16 per tonne 
of CO2 in 2013 and rising linearly to £30 per tonne in 2020.
Chicago Convention – known formally as the International Convention 
on Civil Aviation, this is a treaty dating from 1944 that established the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation. Among the terms of the  
convention is a provision that duty cannot be charged on fuel used in 
international aviation.
Energy Company Obligation (ECO) – the Energy Act 2011 amends existing 
powers in the Gas Act 1986, Electricity Act 1989 and the Utilities Act 
2000 to enable the Secretary of State to create a new Energy Company 
Obligation to take over from the existing obligations to reduce carbon 
emissions – the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) and Community 
Energy Saving Programme (CESP) – which expired at the end of 2012 and 
to work alongside the Green Deal finance offer by targeting appropriate 
measures at those households that are likely to need additional support, in 
particular those containing vulnerable people on low incomes and those in 
hard-to-treat housing.
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EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – the European Union greenhouse 
gas emissions trading scheme began in 2005 and covers carbon dioxide 
emissions from six sectors of heavy industry, including electricity generation, 
steel-making, cement-making, pulp and paper, and glass. Companies covered 
by the scheme may emit only a certain quota of carbon dioxide each year, 
and are issued with carbon permits for every tonne of the quota. They can 
trade these permits with each other. In successive phases of the scheme, the 
quota is reduced so that the overall emissions fall.
Feed-in tariff (FIT) – a feed-in tariff scheme offers guaranteed cash 
payments to home-owners, businesses and organisations such as schools 
and community groups that generate their own electricity through small-
scale green energy installations such as solar photovoltaic (PV) panels or 
wind turbines. It guarantees a minimum payment for all electricity generated 
by the system as well as an additional payment for the unused electricity 
produced that can be exported to the grid, known as the generation 
tariff and export tariff respectively. The level of payment depends on the 
technology and whether it is being fitted to an existing home or installed 
as part of a new build. In the UK, future payments are guaranteed for the 
next 20 years for solar and wind turbine-generated power and are linked to 
inflation. Solar installations registered before 1 August 2012 will receive the 
payment for 25 years.
Green Deal – a new UK government scheme to tie low-interest loans, 
issued by Green Deal Providers, for energy-efficiency improvements to the 
energy bills of the properties the upgrades are performed on. These debts 
would then be passed on to new occupiers when they take over the payment 
of the bills. It is proposed that the costs of the loan repayments would be less 
than the savings on the bills from the upgrades, although this will not be a 
legally enforceable guarantee. The Green Deal will work in conjunction with 
the Energy Company Obligation (ECO).
Heat replacement effect – in the context of Products Policy (see page 70), 
this relates to the impact of improvements in appliance efficiency resulting 
in reductions (savings) in electricity consumption. However, at the same 
time, improved efficiency levels mean that less waste heat is generated from 
electrical products. To maintain the same levels of warmth in the home, it 
is therefore assumed that additional heating is required to replace this lost 
heat. The assumptions applied in modelling here the impact of product policy 
on both electricity consumption and heating fuel consumption in the home 
is consistent with the government’s own assumptions.
Living Costs and Food Survey (LCF) – the Living Costs and Food Survey 
(LCF) is a survey by the Office of National Statistics which collects 
information on household expenditure, food consumption and income, 
reflecting household budgets across the country. In April 2001, the Family 
Expenditure Survey (1961–2001) and the National Food Survey (1974–
2000) were combined to form the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS). 
From January 2008, the EFS became known as the Living Costs and Food 
Survey (LCF), a module of the Integrated Household Survey (IHS). The survey 
includes 12,000 households per year.
Pension Credit – a means-tested benefit aimed at the poorest retired 
people. It has two elements. Guarantee Credit is an income-based benefit 
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which is paid if the income of the applicant and partner (plus a notional 
income from savings) is below a certain level. The minimum age for claiming 
is rising in line with the increase in women’s retirement age; it is currently 
just over 60, but by April 2020 the minimum age for claiming will be 65. 
When the applicant or partner reaches 65, the second element, Savings 
Credit, is also payable. Savings Credit is designed to ‘reward’ people who 
saved for their pension during their working life. It therefore provides an 
additional benefit to retired people who are not well off and may not qualify 
for the full Guarantee Credit, but do have savings or a personal pension.
Product Policy – a policy measure aimed at influencing the design of a 
product so as to reduce its impact on the environment. In this context, it 
usually refers to tightening regulatory standards for the energy or water 
consumption of household appliances and electronic devices.
Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) – a payment system for the generation of 
heat from renewable energy sources. The RHI operates in a similar manner 
to the feed-in tariff scheme. In the first phase, which started in November 
2011, payments are paid to owners who install renewable heat-generation 
equipment in non-domestic buildings. The extension of the RHI to domestic 
buildings has been delayed, but it is expected in 2013. Through the RHI, 
generators are paid for hot water and heat which they use themselves. The 
RHI tariff depends on which renewable heat systems are used and the scale 
of generation, and the annual subsidy will last for 20 years.
Renewables Obligation (RO) – a policy designed to encourage generation 
of electricity from eligible renewable sources in the United Kingdom. The RO 
places an obligation on licensed electricity suppliers in the United Kingdom 
to source an increasing proportion of electricity from renewable sources.
Smart meter – a smart meter is usually an electrical meter that 
records consumption of electric energy in intervals of an hour or less 
and communicates that information at least daily back to the utility 
for monitoring and billing purposes. Smart meters enable two-way 
communication between the meter and the central system. Unlike home 
energy monitors, smart meters can gather data for remote reporting.  
Such an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) differs from traditional 
automatic meter reading (AMR) in that it enables two-way communications 
with the meter.
Universal Credit – a new welfare benefit in the United Kingdom that will 
replace all the main means-tested benefits and tax credits for working-age 
people except for Council Tax Benefit. The government plans to introduce 
Universal Credit over the period 2013–17.
Warm Home Discount Scheme – a scheme which helps some older people 
with energy costs. Energy companies give those eligible a discount on their 
bill (£130 in 2012/13). People are eligible if they are less than 80 years 
old and receiving only the Guarantee Credit element of Pension Credit (no 
Savings Credit) or if they are over 80 and receiving the Guarantee Credit 
element of Pension Credit (even if they receive Savings Credit as well). Some 
other older people are eligible, but the rules vary depending on which energy 
supplier they are with.
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Weather Correction – energy consumption from different time frames 
needs to be corrected for the weather to allow useful comparison. For 
example, energy used for heating in a cold winter will be higher than in a 
warm winter; the consumption is therefore corrected by degree days which 
account for the time that the ambient temperature is below 16.5°C.
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1 The non-metered fuels are all household fuels except electricity and mains gas. The main 
ones are oil, coal, smokeless fuel, bulk liquid petroleum gas (LPG), bottled gas, anthracite nuts 
and grain, wood and peat.
2 The tax on transport fuels would be passed on to those buying fuel directly (and then 
through the price of tickets for buses, coaches and diesel trains, in the same way that the 
cost of fuel duty is already passed on). Because a treaty prohibits imposing taxes directly on 
fuel for international aviation, the tax would instead be on aviation emissions, passed on to 
people buying airline tickets.
3 See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-take-up-09-10.pdf and  
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/income_analysis/jun_2010/0809_Publication.pdf
4 A household is currently defined as being in fuel poverty if it would need to spend more 
than 10% of its income to achieve a certain level of household warmth and other necessary 
energy services.
5 When households save money through energy-efficiency measures, they may spend some 
or all of that money on using energy to make their homes warmer or for other purposes, so 
that the energy savings from the energy-efficiency measures are less than anticipated. This is 
called the rebound effect.
6 DECC (November 2011) ‘Estimated impacts of energy and climate change policies on  
energy prices and bills’. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/68820/3593-estimated-impacts-of-our-policies-on- 
energy-prices.pdf
7 Using DECC’s  Central Scenario, see: www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/about-us/economics-
social-research/2933-fossil-fuel-price-projections-summary.pdf
8 These were developed through CSE’s work with DECC, in conjunction with DECC’s Fuel 
Poverty team.
9 The dataset was developed through the project: ‘Understanding the social impacts of UK 
climate change policies’, being undertaken by CSE, working with the Universities of Bristol 
and Oxford, and with funding from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
10 The non-metered fuels are all fuels except electricity and mains gas. The main ones are oil, 
coal, smokeless fuel, bulk liquid petroleum gas (LPG), bottled gas, anthracite nuts and grain, 
wood and peat. 
11 While this is strictly an energy, rather than a carbon, tax its imposition is justified because it 
removes an environmentally perverse subsidy on energy use.
12 The assumptions underlying Product Policy are equivalent to those used by DECC, as 
supplied by Defra’s Market Transformation Programme (MTP) team.
13 Table A2-2: Population projections by the Office for National Statistics (Great 
Britain) available at: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.
html?edition=tcm%3A77-229866
14 C. Giles and J. McCrae (1995), ‘TAXBEN: The IFS microsimulation tax and benefit model’, IFS 
Working Paper, available at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp1995.pdf. Although this paper is 
dated, most of the main features of the model have not changed since then.
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15 More precisely, the transition from the current system of means-tested benefits and tax 
credits to Universal Credit will be finished by the end of 2017: see DWP (2011) ‘Managing 
the build up of claims to Universal Credit’, Universal Credit Policy Briefing Note 15, available 
at: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/ucpbn-15-managing-claims.pdf. Thus there will still be a 
small number of families claiming the current set of means-tested benefits and tax credits 
at the start of the 2017–18 fiscal year. We ignore this for the purposes of our analysis, 
assuming that Universal Credit is fully in place. 
16 Note that not all aspects of the operation of Universal Credit have yet been decided upon. 
We therefore consider the variant outlined in the government’s Welfare Reform White 
Paper published in November 2010 and ignore some aspects of the tax and benefit system 
(for more details see M. Brewer, J. Browne and W. Jin (2011) ‘Universal Credit: a preliminary 
analysis of its impact on incomes and work incentives’, Fiscal Studies Vol. 33 (1) pp. 39–71, 
available at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/5415). This has been superseded by later 
announcements concerning the localisation of Council Tax Benefit (meaning that this will not 
now be incorporated within Universal Credit), but as not all details of how this will operate 
have been announced, we continue with the proposals in the White Paper. Changes to 
Universal Credit announced since the White Paper would in any case make little difference 
to the gain and loss for each family from the reforms we consider here. 
17 The taper rate is the rate at which Universal Credit will be withdrawn for each additional 
pound of income. For example, a taper rate of 65% means that for an additional pound of 
income, UC will be reduced by 65p, so the claimant will keep 35% of any additional income.
18 See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-take-up-09-10.pdf and  
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/income_analysis/feb2012/tkup_full_report_0910.pdf
19 According to DWP analysis, between 62% and 68% of pensioners entitled to Pension 
Credit claimed their entitlements in 2009–10, with between 20% and 27% of the total cash 
entitlement not being claimed. See http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/income_analysis/feb2012/
tkup_full_report_0910.pdf
20 See Browne, J. (2012), ‘A £10,000 personal allowance: who would benefit, and would it boost 
the economy?’ IFS Observation, available at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6045.
21 This policy involves increasing the Pension Credit Guarantee by £150/year for singles and 
£270/year for couples and increasing Universal Credit by £150/year for singles without 
children, £120/year for lone parents, £375/year for couples without children and £150/year 
for couples with children. 
22  HRP refers to the ‘Household Reference Person’, defined as the householder with the 
highest income (or the oldest of two or more householders with the same income)
23 Note that while the CHAID model does not use the ‘no overall change’ category, in fact there 
are four nodes, totalling some 1.9 million households, that have a mean net/gain within the 
+/-£52 bracket and hence would be classed as ‘no change’ according to our definition. This is 
not far off the actual count of households in this category (some 1.6 million).
24 DECC (June 2011) ‘National Energy Efficiency Data-Framework: Report on the 
development of the data-framework and initial analysis’. Available at: http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130109092117/http://decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/stats/energy/
energy-efficiency/2078-need-data-framework-report.pdf
25 The Home Energy Efficiency Database is managed by the Energy Saving Trust and can be 
briefly described as a national database which tracks house-by-house the energy efficiency 
characteristics of the UK’s housing stock.
26 Data source: Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Table 3.1: Domestic energy 
consumption by fuel 1970 to 2010 and Table 1.3c: Seasonally adjusted and temperature 
corrected final energy consumption data.
27 DECC (November 2011). ‘Estimated impacts of energy and climate change policies on 
energy prices and bills’. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/68820/3593-estimated-impacts-of-our-policies-on- 
energy-prices.pdf
28 The heat replacement effect takes account of the fact that, as a result of efficiency 
improvements, consumer products in the home produce less heat. To maintain the same level 
of thermal comfort, the householder therefore needs to increase heating fuel consumption.
29 Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics: Table 4.1.1: Natural gas and colliery methane 
production and consumption, 1970 to 2010; Table 5.1.2: Electricity supply, availability and 
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consumption, 1970 to 2010. Available at: www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/
energy_stats/source/source.aspx 
30 Table A2-2: Population projections by the Office for National Statistics (Great 
Britain) available at: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.
html?edition=tcm%3A77-229866
31 DECC (November 2011) ‘Estimated impacts of energy and climate change policies on  
energy prices and bills’. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/68820/3593-estimated-impacts-of-our-policies-on- 
energy-prices.pdf
32 Sanders and Phillipson, ‘Review of Differences between Measured and Theoretical Energy 
Savings for Insulation Measures, Centre for Research on Indoor Climate and Health’, Glasgow 
Caledonian University: December 2006
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